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Abstract
This Note explores the controversy surrounding MDPs. Part I surveys the legal activities of
the Big Six accounting firms. Part I then analyzes the current U.S. ethics rules governing law firm
ownership, examines proposed U.S. ethics rules that were never adopted, and discusses other U.S.
ethics rules related to the practice of MDPs. In addition, Part I studies England’s treatment of law
firm ownership and MDPs. Finally, Part I offers other reasons for the restrictive rules governing
law firm ownership. Part II investigates the arguments in favor of and against MDPs. Part III
argues that the current ethics rules permit lawyers to face problems similar to those encountered
by lawyers practicing in MDPs. This Note concludes that MDPs should be permitted in the United
States.
BIG SIX ACCOUNTING FIRMS SHOP WORLDWIDE FOR
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I don't like the idea of fighting the accountants at the rules
barricades. We should match them - and best them - with
service, quality, and performance, and not by throwing a lot
of monopolistic "professional" rules at them to squelch inno-
vation and evolution .... So let's give credit where credit is
due. It sounds like the bean counters are outcompeting us
and outinnovating us. Let's look for lessons, and see what we
can learn.1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Big Six 2 accounting firms ("Big Six")
have moved into the legal services market by establishing, acquir-
ing, or forming ties with law firms around the world.3 In coun-
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1. See The Big Six Horns In, AM. LAw., Dec. 1996, at 36 (quoting partner with U.S.-
based law firm Lucash, Gesmer & Updegrove discussing how large law firms can com-
pete with Big Six accounting firms).
2. See The 1997 Accounting Today Top 100 Tax and Accounting Firms, ACCT. TODAY,
Mar. 17-Apr. 6, 1997, at 25 (demonstrating that Big Six refers to six accounting firms
with highest revenues per year). The Big Six accounting firms are Arthur Andersen
L.L.P. ("Andersen"), Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P. ("Coopers"), Deloitte & Touche L.L.P.
("Deloitte & Touche"), Ernst & Young L.L.P. ("Ernst & Young"), KPMG Peat Marwick
L.L.P. ("KPMG"), and Price Waterhouse L.L.P. ("Price Waterhouse"). Id. The Big Six,
however, may soon be reduced to the Big Four: on September 18, 1997 Coopers and
Price Waterhouse announced that they plan to merge following approval by the firms'
partners. See Elizabeth MacDonald & Joann S. Lublin, Coopers and Price Waterhouse to
Merge: Biggest Accounting Firm to Result, But Partners May Not Go Along, WALL ST. J., Sept.
19, 1997, at A3 (discussing Coopers-Price Waterhouse proposed merger). Ernst &
Young and KPMG also recently announced that they will merge if approved by the
firms' partners. See Elizabeth MacDonald, Ernst & Young To Merge with KPMG: Deal Seals
Transformation of Accounting Industry Into One-Stop Providers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1997, at
A3 (discussing Ernst & Young-KPMG proposed merger).
3. See John E. Morris, London Braces for the Big Six Invasion, AM. LAw., Dec. 1996, at
5 (noting that Big Six firms have "assaulted" legal markets in Europe and in rest of
world). Among other locations, Price Waterhouse operates a law firm in the United
Kingdom and has a network of associated law firms in Europe. See Hooman Bassirian,
Dutch Court Blocks Big Six MDP Plans as Coopers Falters, AccT. AGE, Feb. 20, 1997, at 2
(explaining Price Waterhouse "operates" law firm in United Kingdom); Chris Klein,
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tries4 that prohibit multi-discipline practices5 ("MDPs"), the Big
Six have been successful in developing legal practices by enter-
ing into cooperation agreements and alliances with and forming
Gold Rush, Thin Stakes: U.S. Branches Face Fierce Competition From UK. Solicitors, Account-
ants, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1996, at Al (revealing that Price Waterhouse has network of
law firms in Europe). Andersen operates a law practice in, among other countries, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, and France. See Bassirian, supra, at 2 (noting
that Andersen "operates" legal practice in United Kingdom and Netherlands); Nick
Ferguson, Spanish Firms Regroup to Prepare for A Turbulent Future, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Oct.
1997, at 38 (explaining large Spanish law firm is part of Andersen's worldwide network
of law firms); Klein, supra, at Al (noting that Andersen operates law firm in France).
Coopers' law activities include ties with a U.K. law firm. See MDPs - All the Rage, But
Beware Conflicting Interests, Accr. AGE, Feb. 3, 1997, at 11 [hereinafter All the Rage] (not-
ing that Coopers "set up" U.K. law firm in 1997). KPMG, among other places, has a law
firm in France, an associated law firm in England, and an alliance with a law firm in
Sweden. See Karen Dillon & Catrin Griffiths, KPMG Fidal the Largest Law Firm on the
Continent, LEGAL Bus., July-Aug. 1991, at 26 (explaining KPMG has law firm in France);
Top Manchester Accountant Slams 'Big Six' Practices, MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS, Feb. 25,
1997, at 8 [hereinafter Top Manchester Accountant] (noting KPMG "set up" associated law
firm in England); New Swedish KPMG-Linked Firm Faces Bar Limits, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct.
1997, at 5-6 [hereinafter Swedish KPMG-Linked Firm] (noting that new Swedish law firm
is member of KPMG's international network of law firms). Deloitte & Touche's law
activities include an alliance with a Dutch law firm. See Deloitte & Touche in Deal with
Lawyers AKD, FINANCIEELE DAGBLAD, Feb. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
TXTNWS File [hereinafter Deloitte & Touche in Deal] (explaining Deloitte & Touche
formed close alliance with Dutch law firm). Finally, Ernst & Young has alliances with
several Dutch law firms, has legal practices in Switzerland, Spain, Germany, and France,
and has links to a Canadian law firm, among other law activities. See Dutch Veto 'One-Stop
Shops', ACCOUNTANT, Mar. 1997, at 8 (discussing that Ernst & Young has agreements
with several Dutch law firms and Canadian law firm); Accountants on the Brink of Taking
Law Into Their Hands, LAWYER, Nov. 12, 1996, at 7 [hereinafter Accountants on the Brink]
(noting that Ernst & Young has legal practices in Switzerland, Spain, Germany, and
France); E&Y in One-Stop Shop Threat, LAWYER, July 15, 1997, at 5 (explaining Ernst &
Young has links to Canadian law firm).
4. See, e.g., Edwin Godfrey & Anne Damerell, England and Wales, in LAw WITHOUT
FRONTIERS: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS APPLICABLE
TO THE CROss-BORDER PRACTICE OF LAW 51, 72 (Edwin Godfrey ed., 1995) [hereinafter
LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS] (revealing that England prohibits MDPs); Justus Vocite, The
Netherlands, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra, at 107, 124 (explaining Netherlands
only permits MDPs with notaries, tax consultants, or patent agents as partners, not ac-
countants); E. James Arnett, Canada: Ontario, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra, at 165,
180 (noting that Ontario's Law Society of Upper Canada prohibits multi-discipline
practices).
5. See L. Harold Levinson, Independent Law Firms that Practice Law Only: Society's
Need, the Legal Profession's Responsibility, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 229, 261 (1990) (defining multi-
discipline practices). In this Note, multi-discipline practice ("MDP") refers either to a
partnership that includes a lawyer or lawyers and a nonlawyer or nonlawyers as partners
and that offers legal as well as nonlegal services to clients or to a professional corpora-
tion or association authorized to practice law for a profit that is partially owned by a
nonlawyer or nonlawyers. See id. (describing MDPs).
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networks of' law firms to circumvent the restriction.6  In some
countries7 accounting firms dominate the, legal practice,' while
in other countries9 accounting firms must focus their legal work
in the tax area because local bar associations place insurmounta-
ble restrictions on the practice of law by accounting firms and
other organizations owned by nonlawyers.1 ° Overall, the Big
6. See, e.g., Emily Barker, More Accounting Firms Eye The UK. Legal Market, Am. LAW.,
Apr. 1996, at 13 (discussing Price Waterhouse's relationship with associated law firm in
England); Bassirian, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining Andersen "operates" law firm in
England and Andersen reached agreement with Amsterdam bar association to open law
firm in Netherlands); Deloitte & Touche In Deal, supra note 3 (noting Deloitte & Touche
formed close alliance with Dutch law firm); Larry Smith, One Stop Shopping to the Nth
Degree... Toronto the Latest Tell Tale Sign of Big-6 Legal Ambitions, COUNSEL, July 7, 1997,
at 2, 3 [hereinafter Smith, One Stop Shopping] (noting that Canadian law firm recently
entered into close arrangement with Ernst & Young).
7. See Klein, supra note 3, at Al (revealing that particularly in France and Spain
accounting firms dominate legal realm). For example, in Spain, where MDPs are not
prohibited, five of the top ten law firms in revenues for 1996 were Big Six's legal arms.
SeeJavier Sans Roig, Spain, in LAw WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 125, 139 (exam-
ining Spanish rules governing MDPs); Ferguson, supra note 3, at 38, 39 (analyzing
Spanish law firms' 1996 revenues). In France, where MDPs also are permitted, the
largest law firm is a Big Six firm's tax and legal division. SeeJacques Buhart, France, in
LAw WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 74, 80 (discussing French regulations gov-
erning MDPs); Dillon & Griffiths, supra note 3, at 26 (revealing that KPMG's legal and
tax division in France is country's largest law firm according to firm's public relations
officer).
8. See Klein, supra note 3, at Al (describing accounting firms' activities in France
and Spain). In France, in 1996 six of the ten largest law firms were law departments of
accounting firms. See id. Andersen boasts that through its affiliated law firms, it is the
largest legal services provider on the European continent. See Morris, supra note 3, at 5.
9. See, e.g., Smith, One Stop Shopping, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining in United States
MDPs are not permitted).
10. See Klein, supra note 3, at Al (explaining accounting firms' legal work mainly
focuses on tax law because local bar associations restrict accounting firms' law activi-
ties); see, e.g., Smith, One Stop Shopping, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining in United States
accounting firms cannot practice law or own law firms because MDPs are generally
prohibited). In the United States, the Agency Practice Act of 1965 ("Agency Practice
Act") permits nonlawyers to engage in tax practice so long as they are qualified as certi-
fied public accountants ("CPA"). See Agency Practice Act of 1965, 5 U.S.C. § 500(c);
(1997) (stating that "[a]n individual who is duly qualified to practice as a certified pub-
lic accountant ... may represent a person before the Internal Revenue Service of the
Treasury Department."); see also Levinson, supra note 5, at 240 & n.19 (examining
Agency Practice Act). In addition, the Agency Practice Act authorizes government
agencies to permit nonlawyers to practice before them. See 5 U.S.C. § 500(d) (1) (stat-
ing that "[t]his section does not ... grant or deny to an individual . . . the right to
appear for or represent a person before an agency or in an agency proceeding."); Lev-
inson, supra, at 240 n.19 (analyzing Agency Practice Act). The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice "is responsible for administering and enforcing the internal revenue laws, except
those relating to alcohol, tobacco, firearms, explosives, and wagering." See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 564 (abr. 6th ed. 1990) (defining Internal Revenue Service).
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Six's law practices have taken a considerable amount of work
from traditional law firms.11 Although the competition from ac-
counting firms is relatively new for law firms,' 2 the intensity of
the competition will likely increase over time as accounting
firms' law departments increasingly compete for legal work.13
According to one commentator, the controversy surrounding
law firm diversification will define the practice of law in the
United States for the next century.
14
Accounting firms became visible legal service providers in
Europe in the tax field because European law firms emphasized
litigation"5 and, thus, neglected to perform tax work. 6 Accord-
ing to one person involved in the debate over MDPs, lawyer-ac-
countant combinations in Europe may be inevitable because Eu-
ropean clients traditionally have viewed professional services as
interrelated, expecting that one set of professionals will meet
their needs and making little distinction between services pro-
11. See Klein, supra note 3, at Al (discussing competition between accounting
firms and law firms for legal work). Multinational accounting firms primarily provide
advice on countries' tax laws, though they have increasingly advised on laws governing
other subjects. See Richard L. Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
737, 762 (1994).
12. See Klein, supra note 3, at Al (commenting on competition between account-
ing firms and law firms).
13. See id.' (revealing results of survey). One commentator notes that "[n]ew legal
business is increasingly being snapped up by international accounting firms" such as
Price Waterhouse, Andersen, and KPMG. Id. A principal of a Pennsylvania, U.S.-based
management consultancy firm believes that the Big Six "present a significant threat to
law firm practices - a threat that has yet to pierce the consciousness of many lawyers."
See Ward Bower, The New Competition: Time For A Wake-Up Call?, AM. LAw., Oct. 1994, at
23. At least one commentator warns that Ontario's prohibition of MDPs is similar to
the prohibition in U.S. jurisdictions: "If a Big-[Six] ... firm can tiptoe through the
regulatory tulips in Toronto, it's not hard to imagine them soon getting around similar
bar impediments in the [United States] ... as well." Smith, One Stop Shopping, supra
note 6, at 3. An English reporter notes that "[t]hroughout... [London's] legal com-
munity, the realisation has dawned within the last week or two that there can be no
possibility of mistaking the seriousness with which the big... [London] accountancy
outfits intend to tackle legal services." Edward Fennell, Birth of the Mega-Biz?, TIMES
(London), May 20, 1997, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, TXTNWS File. One com-
mentator believes that the Big Six's "master plan is to conquer the world first, then
return home to the U[nited] S[tates]." The Big Six Horns In, AM. LAw., Dec. 1996, at 36.
14. See Gary A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm Di-
versification, 61 FORD m L. REv. 559, 560 (1992) (commenting on debate over law firm
diversification).
15. See Abel, supra note 11, at 747 (discussing accounting firms' entry into legal
services).
16. See id. (explaining European lawyers were slow to develop tax practices because
they emphasized litigation).
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vided by accountants and those provided by lawyers. 7 In addi-
tion, the legal market is attractive to accounting firms because it
is larger than the tax market and there are strong synergies be-
tween tax, corporate finance, and law.18
In the United States, the Disciplinary Rules 9 ("DR") in the
American Bar Association's 2° ("ABA") Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility21 ("Model Code") and the ABA's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct2 2 ("Model Rules"), which have
been adopted by the majority of states in some form, 2 3 have pre-
17. See Larry Smith, New Adversaries: Big-6 Accounting Firms Encroach Foreign Legal
Turf, COUNSEL, Mar. 6, 1995, at 5-6 [hereinafter Smith, New Adversaries] (noting that
Price Waterhouse's vice chairman of litigation support's view).
18. See All the Rage, supra note 3, at 11 (describing accounting firms' attraction to
legal market). The Big Six should effectively sell any legal services they provide because
they
have thousands of employees worldwide; they are leaders in the use of technol-
ogy; they make significant investments in research and development. The Big
Six enjoy brand name recognition. They invest multiples of what law firms
spend on advertising, and have years of experience in marketing intangible
professional services to individuals and businesses of means.
Bower, supra note 13, at 23.
19. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Pmbl. and Prelim. Statement
(1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] (describing Disciplinary Rules). The Model Code of
Professional Responsibility's ("Model Code") Preamble and Preliminary Statement ex-
plains that "[t]he Disciplinary Rules ... are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary
Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being
subject to disciplinary action." Id.
20. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 912 (2d
ed. 1994) (describing American Bar Association). The American Bar Association
("ABA") is a voluntary, private organization of lawyers that controls its own member-
ship, governs its affairs, and is not accountable to any public body for action the ABA
might take on organizational or policy matters. Id. The ABA, in addition, "has long
been recognized as the leading national organization of lawyers, and it has succeeded
in convincing state courts, state legislatures, federal courts and federal agencies to
adopt some form of its model codes, giving the codes, as so adopted, the effect of law."
Id. at 13.
21. See id. (describing Model Code). The Model Code was adopted by the ABA in
1969 as a model code of regulation of the conduct of lawyers. See id. (discussing Model
Code's purpose).
22. See id. at 15 (discussing Model Rules of Professional Conduct). The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") were adopted by the ABA in 1983 to
replace the Model Code. Id.
23. See id. at 13-16 (discussing adoption of Model Code and Model Rules by U.S.
jurisdictions). The Model Code was adopted by almost every state and by most federal
courts. Id. at 13. As of August 1993, the Model Rules were adopted in some form by 36
states and the District of Columbia while other states retained their versions of the
Model Code. Id. at 15. The federal courts, including the Supreme Court, cite the
Model Code and Model Rules as authority in decisions concerning lawyers' professional
conduct. Id. at 16.
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vented nonlawyers from providing legal services,2 4 have limited
the association of lawyers with nonlawyers,25 and have controlled
lawyers' nonlegal services. 26  The rules prohibiting lawyer-non-
lawyer combinations from practicing law were implemented to
guard against several potential ethics problems.27 The restric-
tions in the Model Rules and Model Code have survived despite
several years of discussions by state bar committees concerning
multiprofessional offices. 28  Only Washington, D.C., through
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1996) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES] (fee-sharing, lawyer-nonlawyer partnership, and independent profes-
sional judgment); MODEL CODE, supra note 19, DR 3-102(A) (fee-sharing); id. DRs 3-
103(A), 5-107(C) (lawyer-nonlawyer partnership); id. DR 5-107(B) (independent pro-
fessional judgment); see also Munneke, supra note 14, at 566 (noting that in United
States combination of ABA's Model Rules and DRs have "kept nonlawyers from provid-
ing legal services"). The ABA has consistently opposed lay investment in law practices.
See David A. Kaplan, Want to Invest in a Law Firm?; Ethics Change in Works, NAT'L L.J.,Jan.
16, 1987, at I (describing ABA's position).
25. See MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 1.6 (confidentiality); id. Rule 1.7 (con-
flicts of interest); id. Rule 2.1 (independent professional judgment); id. Rule 5.4 (fee-
sharing, lawyer-nonlawyer partnership, and independent professional judgment); id.
Rule 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law); id. Rule 5.7 (law-related services); id. Rule 7.2
(advertising); id. Rule 7.3 (client solicitation); MODEL CODE, supra note 19, DR 2-
101(A) (advertising); id. DR 2-103(A), (B) (client solicitation); id. DR 3-101 (A) (unau-
thorized practice of law); id. DR 3-102(A) (fee-sharing); id. DR 3-103(A), 5-107(C) (law-
yer-nonlawyer partnership); id. DR 4-101 (confidentiality); id. DR 5-101 (A), 5-104(B)
(conflicts of interest); id. DR 5-107(B) (independent professional judgment). Com-
mentators agree that ethics rules have prevented lawyers and nonlawyers from entering
into joint business ventures to provide legal services. Munneke, supra note 14, at 566;
HARRYJ. HAYNSWORTH, MARKETING AND LEGAL ETHICS: THE RULES AND RISKS 120 (rev.
ed. 1990); Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the
Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 616, 622 (1989).
26. See MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 5.7 (law-related services); see also Mun-
neke, supra note 14, at 566 (stating that in United States combination of ABA's Model
Rules and DRs in Model Code have kept lawyers out of nonlegal activities). Under
current rules, law firms cannot themselves offer both legal and nonlegal services, except
where the nonlegal services are ancillary to the practice of law. See Munneke, supra, at
573 (discussing ancillary businesses). Law firms may, however, operate subsidiaries to
provide the nonlegal services. See id. (discussing ancillary activities under current regu-
latory scheme).
27. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARDJR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 470-71 (1985) (explain-
ing lawyer-nonlawyer law partnerships potentially create problems of unauthorized
practice of law and interference with lawyers' professional judgment and with confiden-
tiality and client solicitation).
28. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 573 n.71 (explaining although multiprofes-
sional offices have been discussed for several years, chilling effect of ethics rules has
prevented widespread experimentation with concept). At least one commentator
notes, however, that the restrictive "regulations are now giving way to more permissive
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Washington, D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct 29  ("D.C.
Rules") Rule 5.4, permits nonlawyers to become partners in or-
ganizations that provide legal services, 3° so long as certain re-
quirements are followed. 31 Nevertheless, true multiprofessional
offices remain infeasible despite the appeal of organizations that
can solve complex problems.1
2
In England, the Law Society of England and Wales'3 3 ("Law
Society") Solicitors' Practice Rules34 ("Solicitors' Rules") forbid
solicitors 35 from practicing law in partnership with non-solicitors
through a rule forbidding solicitors from sharing legal fees with
non-solicitors.3 This prohibition prevents MDPs from being
formed in England.37 Prior to 1990, England had a statutory ban
rules governing joint lawyer-nonlawyer ventures, and [that] such activities appear to be
evolving with or without the imprimatur of the organized bar." Id. at 566.
29. See WASHINGTON, D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1997) [herein-
after D.C. RULES] (explaining Washington, D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct ("D.C.
Rules") provide basis for invoking disciplinary process against lawyers governed by D.C.
Rules who fail to comply with obligation or prohibition imposed by Rule).
30. See Practice Guide - Partnership with Non-Lawyers, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) No. 91, 401 (1995), available in Westlaw, ABA-BNA database [hereinafter
Partnership with Non-Lawyers] (noting that Washington, D.C. is only U.S. jurisdiction that
permits lawyers to join nonlawyers in partnerships or professional associations that prac-
tice law). Members of the ethics committee in Washington, D.C. believe the Model
Rules are anticompetitive and cannot be defended. See Kaplan, supra note 24, at 1
(reporting on Washington, D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4).
31. See D.C. RULES, supra note 29, Rule 5.4 (listing requirements for lawyers and
nonlawyers to combine to practice law in Washington, D.C.).
32. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 573 (explaining present U.S. regulatory scheme
does not permit true multiprofessional offices despite fundamental appeal of "concept
of holistic problem solving centers").
33. See FRANCES SILVERMAN, HANDBOOK OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR SOLICITORS
111-12 (2d ed. 1992) (describing Law Society of England and Wales). The Law Society
of England and Wales ("Law Society"), formed by Royal Charter in 1825, is the gov-
erning body of the solicitors' profession and has the power promulgate rules and regu-
lations governing the training and admission of solicitors, regulating practicing certifi-
cates, and controlling the conduct of professional practice and discipline. See id. (de-
fining Law Society).
34. See Solicitors Act, 1974, ch. 47, § 31 (Eng.) [hereinafter Solicitors Act] (grant-
ing Law Society authority to promulgate Solicitors' Practice Rules ("Solicitors' Rules")
to regulate professional practice and conduct and discipline of solicitors).
35. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 969 (defining English solicitors).
Solicitors, in England, are attorneys who may practice in the Bankruptcy Court, county
courts, petty sessions, certain proceedings in the Crown Court, most inferior courts,
and in chambers of the Supreme Court. Id.
36. See SOLICITORS' PRACTICE RULES Rule 7(1) (1990) [hereinafter SOLICITORS'
RULES] (governing fee-sharing).
37. SeeJolyon Patten, UK: In the Mix, POST MAG., Dec. 19, 1996, at 27 (explaining
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on MDPs,3 8 but in 1990 England enacted the Courts and Legal
Services Act 39 which repealed the statutory ban on MDPs.40 The
Law Society, however, has maintained the ban on solicitor-non-
solicitor partnerships.41
This Note explores the controversy surrounding MDPs.
Part I surveys the legal activities of the Big Six accounting firms.
Part I then analyzes the current U.S. ethics rules governing law
firm ownership, examines proposed U.S. ethics rules that were
never adopted, and discusses other U.S. ethics rules related to
the practice of MDPs. In addition, Part I studies England's treat-
ment of law firm ownership and MDPs. Finally, Part I offers
other reasons for the restrictive rules governing law firm owner-
ship. Part II investigates the arguments in favor of and against
MDPs. Part III argues that the current ethics rules permit law-
yers to face problems similar to those encountered by lawyers
practicing in MDPs. This Note concludes that MDPs should be
permitted in the United States.
I. CURRENT PRACTICES OF THE BIG SIX AND ETHICS RULES
GOVERNING MDPs
The United States and England prohibit MDPs.12 The eth-
ics rules governing law firm ownership adopted by the majority
of jurisdictions in the United States prevent, and numerous
other ethics rules obstruct, lawyers and nonlawyers from enter-
ing into partnerships that practice law.43 Similarly, ethics rules
in England do not permit solicitors to practice law with nonlawy-
ers.4 4 Despite the restrictions in England, the Big Six accounting
MDPs involving lawyers do not exist in United Kingdom because of Law Society's rules
forbidding solicitors from engaging in partnerships with non-solicitors).
38. See Solicitors Act § 39 (repealed 1990) (forbidding solicitors from acting as
agents for unqualified persons).
39. Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, ch.41 (Eng.) [hereinafter Courts and
Legal Services Act].
40. See Courts and Legal Services Act § 66(1) (repealing prohibition on solicitors
from acting as unqualified persons' agent).
41. See SiLvERmAN, supra note 33, at 131 (revealing that section 66 of Courts and
Legal Services Act has not yet been brought into force); Waller, supra note 271, at 17
(noting Law Society has continued prohibiting MDPs).
42. See supra notes 9, 37 (discussing countries that prohibit MDPs).
43. See supra notes 25, 26 (listing rules forbidding lawyer-nonlawyer combinations
for practice of law).
44. See supra notes 36, 37 and accompanying text (revealing that England prohibits
MDPs).
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firms have entered the legal services market in England as they
have in other countries, through arrangements that circumvent
the rules.45
A. Current Legal Activities of the Big Six
The Big Six provide legal services in countries throughout
the world. 46  Price Waterhouse L.L.P.47 ("Price Waterhouse"),
for example, operates a law firm in the United Kingdom called
Arnheim & Co.48 ("Arnheim") and has a network of law firms in
Europe with 250 attorneys collectively.49 Price Waterhouse's Eu-
ropean legal practice performs tax work,50 as well as work in
commercial agreements, 51 mergers and acquisitions,52 and capi-
tal markets,53 areas traditionally handled by law firms. 54 The
head of Price Waterhouse's European Union 55 law unit recently
expressed that Price Waterhouse intends to expand and com-
45. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing accounting firms' legal
activities in countries that prohibit MDPs).
46. See supra note 3 (detailing legal practices of Big Six).
47. See supra note 2 (discussing Price Waterhouse).
48. See All the Rage, supra note 3, at 11 (describing Price Waterhouse's legal activi-
ties in United Kingdom); Bassirian, supra note 3, at 2 (same); Top Manchester Accountant,
supra note 3, at 8 (same). Arnheim & Co. ("Arnheim"), an affiliate of Price
Waterhouse, is part of the accounting firm's network of European law firms, and shares
office space and referrals with Price Waterhouse. See Barker, supra note 6, at 13
(describing Arnheim's relationship with Price Waterhouse). In 1996, Arnheim had
only six lawyers. See Morris, supra note 3, at 5 (describing Arnheim). Arnheim, how-
ever, plans to expand to 20 attorneys by 1998 and to 50 by 2001. See Barker, supra, at 13
(discussing Arnheim's future plans).
49. See Klein, supra note 3, at Al (discussing Price Waterhouse's network of lawyers
in Europe); see also Barker, supra note 6, at 13 (noting that Price Waterhouse's Euro-
pean law firm network consisted of 19 law firms in 1996).
50. See Klein, supra note 3, at Al (citing head of Price Waterhouse's European
Union law unit in Brussels, Belgium).




54. See Morris, supra note 3, at 5 (revealing that Price Waterhouse's head of its
European legal affiliates notes that legal affiliates are obtaining work that American and
English law firms might otherwise have performed). According to Price Waterhouse's
head of European legal affiliates, the legal affiliates work on investments into Eastern
Europe, loan and financial documentation for international banks in Spain, insurance
policy documentation, and privatizations. See id. (describing work performed by Price
Waterhouse's European legal affiliates).
55. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 (amending Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-1I), as
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pete with traditional law firms.56
Arthur Andersen L.L.P. 57 ("Andersen") operates a legal
practice in the United Kingdom called Garrett & Co.58 ("Gar-
rett") with offices in seven cities, 9 including London, Reading,
and Leeds, England6 ° and in 1995 opened an office in
Manchester, England, that competes with other law firms for
high-profile corporate work.61 In only three years, Garrett hired
130 fee-earners62 and has successfully recruited lawyers that prac-
tice banking,63 intellectual property, 64 and real estate65 from an-
other English firm.66 Garrett's recruiting activities demonstrate
Andersen's drive to provide a wide range of services.67 Garrett
amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741, in TREA-
TIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987)).
56. See Klein, supra note 3, at Al (quoting head of Price Waterhouse's European
Union law unit). The head of Price Waterhouse's European Union law unit revealed:
"Right now we're not a threat [to law firms], but the avowed intent is different." Id.
Price Waterhouse's head of European legal affiliates added that Price Waterhouse is
interested in competing with law firms for top work and that Price Waterhouse is "not
aiming for the middle ground .... " See Morris, supra note 3, at 5 (revealing Price
Waterhouse's plans according to head of Price Waterhouse's European legal affiliates).
According to a law firm and accounting firm consultant, accounting firms have already
moved towards handling complex legal work and where European "clients used to di-
vide up pieces of a deal between a Davis Polk [& Wardwell, a U.S.-based law firm,] and a
Price Waterhouse . . . [n]ow they're giving a litfle more to Price Waterhouse . . . [and
that] [s]omeday they may give it all to Price Waterhouse." See Smith, New Adversaries,
supra note 17, at 7 (quoting Texas, U.S.-based consultant who works with law firms and
accounting firms).
57. See supra note 2 (discussing Andersen).
58. See Bassirian, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing Garrett & Co. ("Garrett")); Patten,
supra note 37, at 27 (same); Patrick Wilkins, Surprise Defections By Tax Lawyers Threaten
Coopers'Law Aspirations, ACCT. AGE, Oct. 17, 1996, at 1 (same).
59. See Barker, supra note 6, at 13 (discussing Garrett's size).
60. See Smith, New Adversaries, supra note 17, at 6 (describing Garrett's offices).
61. See Top Manchester Accountant, supra note 3, at 8 (revealing activities of Garrett's
Manchester, England office).
62. See Wilkins, supra note 58, at 1 (analyzing Garrett's size). Fee-earners are law
firms' staff members who have client contact and whose work earns money for the firm,
such as assistant solicitors, legal executives, clerks, and trainee solicitors. See SILVERMAN,
supra note 33, at 177 (defining fee-earners).
63. See Smith, New Adversaries, supra note 17, at 7 (examining Garrett's practice
areas).
64. See id. (describing Garrett's practice areas).
65. See id. (analyzing Garrett's practice areas).
66. See id. (describing Garrett's recruiting activities).
67. See id. (explaining Garrett's recruiting is indicative of Andersen's full-service
strategy). A senior partner with England-based law firm Allen & Overy believes that
although Garrett is not yet a threat to top firms, they will be: "Arthur Andersen never
does anything in a half-assed way. I keep saying to my guys, you have to keep your eye
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has continued to progress toward competing with established
law firms for sophisticated corporate work,6" handling major
transactions.69 In the Netherlands, Andersen has entered into a
unique agreement with the Amsterdam bar association permit-
ting Andersen to establish a law practice under the name
Wouters Advocaten.7 ° In Spain, Andersen's legal arm, Andersen
ALT,7 ' recently merged with a Spanish law firm to form J & A
Garrigues Andersen y Cia.72
In 1992, Andersen acquired the Paris office of England-
based law firm S.G. Archibald, 7 thus obtaining a developed cor-
porate and intellectual property practice to complement its tax
in the rearview mirror.... Once they've established themselves, they're going to look
at the big-ticket stuff." Morris, supra note 3, at 5.
68. See Smith, New Adversaries, supra note 17, at 7 (noting that Garrett seems to
have already progressed towards becoming "top-of-the-market" law firm). Garrett's
head explained: "Looking forward three years, there's no doubt that... [Garrett will]
be handling major M[ergers] & A[cquisitions] transactions." See Morris, supra note 3,
at 5 (quoting Garrett's head).
69. See Smith, New Adversaries, supra note 17, at 7 (noting that Garrett was part of
major transactions when firm represented party in bankruptcy transaction and Boston,
U.S.-based client in acquisition of English-based company). Among other work, Garrett
represents U.S.-based Microsoft Corporation and Japan-based Sony Corporation in in-
tellectual property matters like commercial contracts and licensing and has represented
British Airways plc and Dresser Industries, Inc., in acquisitions, has had a lead role in
the privatization of certain English bus companies, has formed funds to invest in Egypt
and India, and conducts compensation and benefits work for a number of large English
companies. See Morris, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing Garrett managing partner's de-
scription of firm's high-profile work).
70. See Bassirian, supra note 3, at 2 (examining Andersen managing partner for
Netherlands' description of firm's law practice in Netherlands); Andersen Appeals Dutch
MDP Ban, LAWYER, May 27, 1997, at 5 (describing Andersen's legal activities in Hol-
land). Upon an attempt to open a second Wouters Advocaten Netherlands office in
Rotterdam, however, Rotterdam's bar association refused to grant permission and the
Dutch bar association, Nederlandse Ordre Van Advocaten ("NOVA"), supported the
local bar's decision. See Bassirian, supra, at 2 (discussing Andersen's legal activities in
Holland).
71. See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 38 (discussing Andersen ALT).
72. See id. at 38-39 (noting that merger occurred in January 1997). J & A Garrigues
Andersen y Cia is the largest law firm in Spain with 505 lawyers and 17 offices through-
out Spain. See id. at 39, 40 (describing size ofJ & A Garrigues Andersen y Cia). The
firm is part of Andersen's worldwide network of law firms and practices in the areas of
tax, corporate law, litigation, labor relations, administrative law, oil and gas, mines, tele-
communications, environment, and maritime law. See Law Firms in Spain, INT'L FIN. L.
RFv., Oct. 1996, at 41, 45 (describingJ & A Garrigues Andersen y Cia's practice).
73. See Klein, supra note 3, at Al (describing Andersen's take over of S.G. Archi-
bald's Paris office). The firm's name became Archibald Andersen Association
d'Avocats ("Archibald Andersen"). See id. (discussing Andersen's take-over of S.G. Ar-
chibald's Paris office).
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work.74 The firm eventually grew from approximately fifty law-
yers before the acquisition75 to over 240 attorneys in 1996.76
Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P. 77 ("Coopers") also moved into
the law firm arena when, in February 1997, the accounting firm
established a law firm in the United Kingdom named Tite &
Lewis78 and transferred thirty staff into the new law firm. 79
Before establishing the law firm, Coopers had a tax and legal
unit that practiced specialized corporate tax and finance-related
work.8"
KPMG Peat Marwick L.L.P.81 ("KPMG") has a large legal
and tax division in France named KPMG Fidal Peat International
("KPMG Fidal").82 In 1991, KPMG Fidal had 760 lawyers83 in
130 offices throughout France,84 that practiced a variety of legal
and tax work on behalf of small and medium-sized French com-
panies.85 That same year, sixty-one percent of KPMG Fidal's
74. See id. (discussing Archibald Andersen's practice). Andersen's partner in
charge of the Paris office explained that Archibald Andersen "provide [s] all the typical
services of a business law firm" and added that Archibald Andersen could "combine
various services for... (its] clients in a global manner, with the same quality everywhere
in the world." See id. (quoting Andersen's partner in charge of the firm's Paris office).
75. See Smith, New Adversaries, supra note 17, at 6 (analyzing S.G. Archibald's Paris
office).
76. See Klein, supra note 3, at Al (noting Archibald Andersen's size).
77. See supra note 2 (discussing Coopers).
78. See All the Rage, supra note 3, at 11 (describing Coopers' legal activities in
United Kingdom); Top Manchester Accountant, supra note 3, at 8 (same). The arrange-
ment between Coopers and Tite & Lewis permits Tite & Lewis to receive work from
Coopers' existing clients and Coopers to gain clients through Tite & Lewis. See Fennell,
supra note 13 (describing arrangement between Tite & Lewis and Coopers).
79. See Top Manchester Accountant, supra note 3, at 8 (quoting Coopers spokesper-
son).
80. See Wilkins, supra note 58, at 1 (adding that Coopers' pioneering tax and legal
unit conducted highly specialized corporate tax and finance-related work).
81. See supra note 2 (discussing KPMG).
82. See Dillon & Griffiths, supra note 3, at 26 (discussing KPMG's legal and tax
activities in France). Fidal began as an independent organization in 1945 when it spun
off from French accounting firm Fiduciare de France. See id. Fidal then joined ac-
counting network Klynveld Main Gordeler ("KMG") in 1979 and KMG merged with
accounting firm Peat Marwick in 1987. See Abel, supra note 11, at 783 (describing for-
mation of KPMG Peat Marwick). Following the merger between KMG and Peat
Marwick, Fidal became KPMG Fidal Peat International ("KPMG Fidal"). See Dillon &
Griffiths, supra, at 26 (discussing KPMG Fidal).
83. See Dillon & Griffiths, supra note 3, at 26 (describing KPMG Fidal's size).
84. See id. (noting that KPMG Fidal's offices are located throughout France, from
major cities like Paris to provincial towns such as Blois in Loire Valley).
85. See id. (explaining KPMG Fidal's offices handle wide variety of legal and tax
work for thousands of small and medium sized French companies).
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work was tax-related and thirty-nine percent legal.86 KPMG
Fidal's legal work included mergers and acquisitions, restructur-
ings, joint ventures, and routine contract work. 7 Today, KPMG
Fidal is the largest law firm in Europe.8  KPMG also recently
formed an alliance in Sweden with new law firm KPMG Wahlin
Advokatbyri. s9
Deloitte & Touche L.L.P.90 ("Deloitte & Touche") has been
active in the Dutch legal market. 1 In February 1997, Deloitte &
Touche formed a close alliance with Dutch law firm Van Anken
Knuppe Damstra ("AKD").2 Deloitte & Touche is seeking alli-
ances with more Dutch law firms to establish a national network
of law firms.9"
Ernst & Young L.L.P.94 ("Ernst & Young") has several coop-
eration agreements95 with Dutch law firms96 and has legal prac-
tices in Switzerland, Spain, Germany, and France.97 Ernst &
86. See id. at 30 (examining KPMG Fidal's practice).
87. See id. at 30-31 (describing KPMG Fidal's practice).
88. See id. at 26 (explaining KPMG Fidal's public relations officer considers KPMG
Fidal largest law firm on European Continent). Many practitioners, however, do not
consider KPMG Fidal a law firm. See id. at 26 (adding that KPMG Fidal management is
bemused by those who suggest that Fidal is not "real" law firm). In response, a partner
of U.S.-based law firm Baker & McKenzie described KPMG Fidal as a competitor. See id.
at 26 (examining debate over whether KPMG Fidal is law firm). Commentators note
that although the majority of KPMG Fidal's competitors "dismiss [KPMG] Fidal out of
hand, typically in snobbish terms[,] ... no one seems willing to count [KPMG] Fidal
out." Id. at 27.
89. See New Swedish KPMG-Linked Firm Faces Bar Limits, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1997,
at 5-6 (explaining new Swedish law firm is member of KPMG-aligned international net-
work of law firms and has cooperation agreement with KPMG).
90. See supra note 2 (discussing Deloitte & Touche).
91. See Deloitte & Touche in Deal, supra note 3 (explaining Deloitte & Touche
formed close alliance with Dutch law firm and is "seeking links with a further two or
three law firms to establish a national network").
92. See id. (commenting on alliance between Deloitte & Touche and Dutch firm of
lawyers and notaries, Van Anken Knuppe Damstra ("AKD")). The terms of the alliance
comply with the Netherlands' strict rules governing the independence of accountants
and tax advisors. See id. (discussing alliance).
93. See id. (discussing Deloitte & Touche's plans).
94. See supra note 2 (discussing Ernst & Young).
95. See Dutch Veto 'One-Stop Shops', supra note 3, at 8 (discussing Ernst & Young's
cooperation agreements). According to the chairman of Ernst & Young's tax group,
under the cooperation agreement there is "pooling" of some profits, but the tax firm
remains independent of the accounting firm. Id.
96. See id. (analyzing Ernst & Young's alliance with Dutch law firms Van Benthem
& Keulem and Banning Van Kemenade & Holland).
97. See Accountants on the Brink, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing Ernst & Young's legal
activities in Europe).
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Young, in addition, has links to a Canadian law firm98 and, ac-
cording to a commentator, is preparing to establish an MDP in
Canada in case the prohibition against MDPs is lifted.99 Ernst &
Young is also deciding whether to establish a legal practice in the
United Kingdom."°°
B. Ethics Rules Governing MDPs
Numerous Model Rules and Model Code provisions govern
the association between lawyers and nonlawyers.'0 1 The majority
of U.S. jurisdictions have adopted the Model Rules or Model
Code provisions forbidding law partnerships between lawyers
and nonlawyers 1 0 2 One jurisdiction, however, permits lawyer-
nonlawyer law partnerships under certain circumstances 10 3 while
another jurisdiction had a similar rule rejected by its supreme
court.1 °4 In England, the government in the past prevented so-
licitors from practicing in MDPs. 105 Despite the law's repeal, the
Law Society's Solicitors' Rules generally continue to forbid
MDPs106 by not permitting solicitors to share legal fees with non-
solicitors.10 7
98. See Smith, One Stop Shopping, supra note 6, at 3 (noting Toronto, Canada-based
law firm Donahue & Associates became part of Ernst & Young in January 1997); E&YIn
One-Stop Shop Threat, supra note 3, at 5 (same).
99. E&Y In One-Stop Shop Threat, supra note 3, at 5.
100. See Accountants on the Brink, supra note 3, at 7 (explaining Ernst & Young
spokeswoman stated that firm is still deciding whether to establish law practice in
United Kingdom); Barker, supra note 6, at 13 (noting that Ernst & Young is close to
opening law firm in England).
101. See supra notes 25, 26 (discussing ethics rules governing lawyer-nonlawyer
combinations).
102. See Partnership with Non-Lawyers, supra note 30 (examining rules governing law-
yer-nonlawyer combinations in U.S. jurisdictions).
103. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing D.C. Rule permitting
MDPs).
104. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILUTY 538 (6th ed. 1995) (explaining North Dakota
Supreme Court rejected rule similar to D.C. Rule 5.4).
105. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting English government's prohi-
bition against MDPs).
106. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing MDPs in England).
107. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing Law Society's rule
prohibiting fee-sharing).
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1. Discussion of U.S. Rules Governing Law Firm Ownership
The Model Rules and Model Code prohibit MDPs. l 0' The
District of Columbia is the only U.S. jurisdiction that permits
lawyers and nonlawyers to enter into partnerships to, or share
ownership of, other organizational forms that provide legal serv-
ices, when certain requirements are satisfied.' 0 9 North Dakota
considered a rule to permit lawyers to practice law in association
with nonlawyers, but the proposal was rejected by the state's
Supreme Court.110
a. The Majority Rule
In the United States, the Model Rules and the Model Code
prohibit nonlawyers from holding an ownership interest in legal
practices.' All United States jurisdictions, except the District of
Columbia, have adopted the ABA's position.1'2 The Model
Code forbids a lawyer from entering into a partnership with a
nonlawyer if the partnership intends to practice law.11 3 In addi-
tion, the Model Code does not permit a lawyer to practice in an
organization authorized to practice law for a profit if a nonlaw-
yer holds a financial interest in the organization, a nonlawyer is
an officer of the organization, or a nonlawyer has the right to
direct a lawyer's professional judgment." 4
The provisions in the Model Rules governing the interac-
108. See supra note 24 (listing Model Rules and Model Code provisions that pre-
vent lawyers and nonlawyers from forming MDPs).
109. See supra note 3.0 and accompanying text (discussing lawyer-nonlawyer combi-
nations in Washington, D.C.).
110. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing North Dakota's pro-
posed rule).
111. MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 5.4; MODEL CODE, supra 19, DRs 3-102(A),
3-103(A), 5-107(B), 5-107(C).
112. See Andrews, supra note 25, at 597 (stating that "ABA rules governing the
association of lawyers and nonlawyers effectively have been made the governing law,
either directly or indirectly, in most states")
113. MODEL CODE, supra note 19, DR 3-103. DR 3-103(A) states: "A lawyer shall
not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership con-
sist of the practice of law." Id.
114. Id. DR 5-107(C). DR 5-107(C) provides:
(C) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corpora-
tion or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) A non-lawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary repre-
sentative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the
lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
(2) A non-lawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
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tion between lawyers and nonlawyers are substantially identical
to the applicable Model Code disciplinary rules.1 15 Model Rule
5.4 prohibits lawyers from sharing fees for legal services and
forming partnerships to provide legal services with nonlawy-
ers.1 16 In addition, Model Rule 5.4 forbids lawyers from practic-
ing law in an organization practicing for profit if a nonlawyer
owns an interest, is a corporate officer, or has the right to direct
lawyers' professional judgment." 7
Model Rule 5.4 preserves the prohibitions against law firm
ownership by nonlawyers first codified in the 1928 addition-of
Canons 33118 and 34119 to the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional
(3) A non-lawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judg-
ment of a lawyer.
Id.
115. See MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 5.4 Model Code comparison (describ-
ing Model Rule 5.4 as substantially identical to Model Code DR 3-102(A), DR 3-103(A),
DR 5-107(B), and DR 5-107(C)).
116. Id. Rule 5.4. Model Rule 5.4 states in part:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except
that:
(1). an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associ-
ate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of
time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more
specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or dis-
appeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the
estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase
price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compen-
sation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in
part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activi-
ties of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
Id.
117. Id. Rule 5.4(d). Model Rule 5.4(d) states:
A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or
association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary repre-
sentative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the
lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judg-
ment of a lawyer.
Id.
118. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 33 (1928). Canon 33 provides:
In the formation of partnerships for the practice of law, no person shall be
admitted or held out as a practitioner or member who is not a member of the
206 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:190
Ethics 120 and continued in the Model Code. 12 ' The Model Code
Ethical Considerations 122 ("EC") explain that lawyers should not
practice law in association with a nonlawyer because lawyers
should not assist or encourage nonlawyers to practice law.123
The comment to Model Rule 5.4 adds that the limitations ex-
pressed in the rule serve to protect lawyers' independent profes-
sional judgment.1 24  The ABA elected to prohibit nonlawyers
from managing legal service providers because the ABA pre-
sumed nonlawyer managers or owners would be tempted more
than lawyers to interfere with the professional relationships of
employed lawyers when profitable to do so. 125
Nevertheless, the Model Rules recognize that legal advice
often involves extralegal elements.1 26  Model Rule 2.1 permits
legal profession duly authorized to practice, and amenable to professional dis-
cipline....
Partnerships between lawyers and members of other professions or non-
professional persons should not be formed or permitted where any part of the
partnership's employment consists of the practice of law.
Id.
119. Id. Canon 34. Canon 34 warns that "[n]o division of fees for legal services is
proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility."
Id.
120. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 13 (explaining Canons of Professional
Ethics were adopted in 1908 by ABA as model code for regulating conduct of lawyers).
121. See MODEL CODE, supra note 19, DRs 3-102(A), 3-103(A), 5-107(B), 5-107(C)
(preserving prohibition of law partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers); MODEL
RULES, supra note 24, Rule 5.4 Model Code comparison (describing Model Rule 5.4 as
substantially identical to Model Code provisions governing lawyer-nonlawyer combina-
tions). The comment to D.C. Rule 5.4 notes that "[t]raditionally, the canons of legal
ethics and disciplinary rules prohibited lawyers from practicing law in a partnership
that includes nonlawyers or in any other organization where a nonlawyer is a share-
holder, director, or officer." D.C. RULES, supra note 29, Rule 5.4 cmt.
122. See MODEL CODE, supra note 19, Pmbl. and Prelim. Statement (discussing Eth-
ical Considerations). The Model Code Preamble and Preliminary Statement explains:
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent
the objectives towards which every member of the profession should strive.
They constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for gui-
dance in many specific situations.
Id.
123. See id. EC 3-8 (commenting on lawyer-nonlawyer law partnerships). EC 3-8
states that "[s]ince a lawyer should not aid or encourage a layman to practice law, he
should not practice law in association with a layman...." Id.
124. MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 5.4 cmt.
125. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 982-83 (examining ABA's motive for
restricting lawyer-nonlawyer combinations). Model Rule 5.4 assumes that the threat of
influence of a nonlawyer manager over lawyers in the same organization "is so serious
that a prophylactic rule prohibiting lay management is necessary." Id.
126. See MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 2.1 (stating that "[i]n rendering advice,
1997] MDPS IN THE UNITED STATES
lawyers to consider moral, economic, social, political, and other
factors, when relevant to clients' needs. 127 The Model Code also
recognizes that lawyers may consider additional extralegal fac-
tors and advises that lawyers may advise clients beyond legal con-
siderations.1
28
b. The Minority Rule
Washington, D.C. remains the only jurisdiction in the
United States that has not fully adopted the ABA's restrictive po-
sition on law firm ownership. 129 The Washington, D.C. Rules of
Professional Conduct allow nonlawyer professionals to work with
lawyers in providing legal services without restricting the nonlaw-
yer to the role of employee.13 ° D.C. Rule 5.4 allows a nonlawyer
a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation"); Munneke,
supra note 14, at 561 n.7 (explaining Model Rule 2.1 acknowledges that "legal advice
incorporates extralegal elements[,] ... that legal problems are seldom purely legal
problems, and that the resolution of complex issues usually requires more than purely
legal advice"). At least one Federal judge has noted that "the complexities of modem
existence prevent attorneys from effectively handling clients' affairs without the help of
others." United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.).
127. MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 2.1. Model Rule 2.1 states that "in render-
ing advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to tie client's situation." Id.
The comment to Model Rule 2.1 adds:
Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain
of another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the profes-
sional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business
matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profes-
sion or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in an-
other field in itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the law-
yer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice
at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of
conflicting recommendations of experts.
Id. Rule 2.1 cmt.
128. See MODEL CODE, supra note 19, EC 7-8 (stating that "[a]dvice of a lawyer to
his client need not be confined to purely legal considerations").
129. See supra note 30 (examining U.S. jurisdictions' rules governing law firm own-
ership); D.C. RULES, supra note 29, Rule 5.4 (stating that nonlawyers may have financial
interest in organization that provides legal services under certain circumstances).
130. See D.C. RULES, supra note 29, Rule 5.4(b) ("A lawyer may practice law in a
partnership or other form of organization in which a financial interest is held or mana-
gerial authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs professional serv-
ices which assist the organization in providing legal services to clients .... "). The
comment to D.C. Rule 5.4 states:
[T] he purpose of liberalizing the rules regarding the possession of a financial
interest or the exercise of management authority by a nonlawyer is to permit
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to hold a financial interest or exercise managerial authority in a
partnership or other form of organization for the practice of law
if the nonlawyer performs professional services that assist the or-
ganization in providing legal services to clients."' Such a combi-
nation, however, may only occur if the sole purpose of the part-
nership or organization is to provide legal services, 13 2 if all those
with a financial interest or managerial authority commit to abide
by the rules of professional conduct,133 if the lawyers with a fi-
nancial interest or managerial authority assume the same re-
sponsibility over nonlawyers as if the nonlawyers were lawyers,"3
nonlawyer professionals to work with lawyers in the delivery of legal services
without being relegated to the role of employee. For example, the Rule per-
mits economists to work in a firm with antitrust or public utility practitioners,
psychologists or psychiatric social workers to work with family law practitioners
to assist in counseling clients, nonlawyer lobbyists to work with lawyers who
perform legislative services, certified public accountants to work in conjunc-
tion with tax lawyers or others who use accountants' services in performing
legal services, and professional managers to serve as office managers, execu-
tive directors, or in similar positions. In all these situations, the professionals
may be given financial interests or managerial responsibility, so long as all of
the requirements of [D.C. Rule 5.4(c)] are met.
Id. Rule 5.4 cmt.
131. Id. Rule 5.4. D.C. Rule 5.4(b) provides:
A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in
which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an
individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the or-
ganization in providing legal services to clients ....
Id.
132. Id. Rule 5.4(b)(1). D.C. Rule 5.4(b)(1) requires that "[t]he partnership or
organization has as its sole purpose providing legal services to clients .... " Id.
133. Id. Rule 5.4(b) (2). D.C. Rule 5.4(b) (2) requires that "[a]ll persons having
such managerial authority or holding a financial interest undertake to abide by [the
D.C. Rules] ...." Id.
134. Id. Rule 5.4(b)(3). D.C. Rule 5.4(b) (3) requires that "[t]he lawyers who have
a financial interest or managerial authority in the partnership or organization under-
take to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent as if nonlawyer
participants were lawyers under [D.C.] Rule 5.1 .... Id. D.C. Rule 5.1 states:
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the
firm conform to the rules of professional conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the rules
of professional conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the rules of
professional conduct if:
(1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, rati-
fies the conduct involved; or
(2) The lawyer has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer or
is a partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, and knows
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and if these requirements are in writing.'35
D.C. Rule 5.4 recognizes that clients increasingly demand a
broad range of professional services from a single provider"3 6
and merges this demand with the traditional limitations on fee-
sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers aimed at protecting law-
yers' professional independence ofjudgment. 13 7 The rule allows
lawyers and nonlawyers to combine in order to provide services
so long as all other D.C. Rules ethical requirements are met by
the organization combining lawyers and nonlawyers. t31 The
D.C. Rules permit fee-sharing in those entities satisfying Rule
5.4's conditions 139 but does not allow an individual or entity to
acquire all or part of a law practice organization for investment
or reasonably should know of the conduct at a time when its conse-
quences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial
action.
Id. Rule 5.1.
135. Id. Rule 5.4(b) (4). D.C. Rule 5.4(b) (4) requires that the conditions of D.C.
Rule 5.4(b)(1) through D.C. Rule 5.4(b)(3) are set forth in writing. Id. The writing
requirement "helps ensure that these important conditions are not overlooked in estab-
lishing the organizational structure of entities in which nonlawyers enjoy an ownership
or managerial role equivalent to that of a partner in a traditional law firm. Id. Rule 5.4
cmt.
136. See id. (addressing demand for broad range of services). The comment to
D.C. Rule 5.4 provides in part:
As the demand increased for a broad range of professional services from a
single source, lawyers employed professionals from other disciplines to work
for them. So long as the nonlawyers remained employees of the lawyers, these
relationships did not violate the disciplinary rules. However, when lawyers and
nonlawyers considered forming partnerships and professional corporations to
provide a combination of legal and other services to the public, they faced
serious obstacles under the former rules.
Id.
137. See id. (describing traditional limitations on fee-sharing).
138. Id. The comment to D.C. Rule 5.4 states in part:
This Rule rejects an absolute prohibition against lawyers and nonlawyersjoin-
ing together to provide collaborative services, but continues to impose tradi-
tional ethical requirements with respect to the organization thus created.
Thus, a lawyer may practice law in an organization where nonlawyers hold a
financial interest or exercise managerial authority, but only if the conditions
set forth in subparagraphs (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) are satisfied, and pursu-
ant to subparagraph (b) (4).
Id.; see supra notes 132-35 (listing requirements of D.C. Rule 5.4(b)(1), (2), (3), and
(4)).
139. See D.C. RULES, supra note 29, Rule 5.4(a) (4) (stating that "[s]haring of fees is
permitted in a partnership or other form of organization which meets the requirements
of paragraph (b)"); see also id. Rule 5.4 cmt. (explaining sharing of fees in organizations
permitted by D.C. Rule 5.4(b) is likely to occur and that D.C. Rule 5.4(a) (4) "makes it
clear that such fee sharing is not prohibited").
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or other purposes. 140 In addition, the rule imposes the same
standard of liability on financially interested lawyers and lawyers
with managerial authority for the ethical misconduct of nonlaw-
yer participants as is imposed on lawyers for the ethical miscon-
duct of lawyers under their direct supervisory authority.14 1
c. Previously Proposed Rules
The movement in favor of law firm diversification dates
back to 1980, when the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Pro-
fessional Standards14 2 ("Kutak Commission") proposed a rule
that permitted nonlawyers to hold an ownership interest in a law
firm provided that certain ethical requirements were satisfied. 43
140. See id. (commenting on nonlawyers' involvement with law firms). D.C. Rule
5.4's comment states that D.C. Rule 5.4(b)
does not permit an individual or entity to acquire all or any part of the owner-
ship of a law partnership or other form of law practice organization for invest-
ment or other purposes. It thus does not permit a corporation, an investment
banking firm, an investor, or any other person or entity to entitle itself to all or
any portion of the income or profits of a law firm or other similar organiza-
tion[,] . . . [s]ince such an investor would not be an individual performing
professional services within the law firm or other organization.
Id.
141. See id. Rule 5.4(b)(3) (describing lawyers' liability for nonlawyer partici-
pants). Within an organization that satisfies the condition of D.C. Rule 5.4,
lawyers with financial interests or managerial authority are held responsible
for ethical misconduct by nonlawyer participants about which the lawyers
know or reasonably should know. This is the same standard of liability con-
templated by Rule 5.1, regarding the responsibilities of lawyers with direct su-
pervisory authority over other lawyers.
Id. Rule 5.4 cmt. In contrast, liability for the ethical misconduct of nonlawyer assistants
is imposed on lawyers having direct supervisory authority over nonlawyer assistants only
if the lawyer actually knows of the misconduct. Id.
142. See HAzARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 15 (explaining ABA president ap-
pointed Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards ("Kutak Commission") in
1977 to recommend changes to Model Code). The ABA Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards was also called the Kutak Commission, named after its chairman
Robert J. Kutak. See id. at 15 (discussing ABA Commission on Evaluation of Profes-
sional Standards).
143. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 579 & n.116 (discussing Kutak Commission's
proposal). The text of Kutak Commission's proposed Model Rule 5.4 stated:
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a financial interest is
held or managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, or by a lawyer acting
in a capacity other than that of representing clients, such as a business corpo-
ration, insurance company, legal services organization or government agency,
but only if the terms of the relationship provide in writing that:
(a) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of profes-
sional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
1997] MDPS IN THE UNITED STATES
The Kutak Commission's proposal represented a more liberal
approach to lawyer-nonlawyer interactions than the existing
Model Code permitted.144 The Kutak Commission recognized
that limiting organizational forms could not solve ethical
problems with client-lawyer relationships.14 The Kutak Com-
mission's proposed Rule 5.4 permitted any organization deliver-
ing legal services, owned or managed in whole or in part by a
nonlawyer, to employ an attorney if the organization respected
the attorney's professional judgment, 146 protected a client's con-
fidential information,"' avoided impermissible advertising and
client solicitation, 48 and charged reasonable fees. 149
(b) information relating to representation of a client is protected as re-
quired by Rule 1.6;
(c) the arrangement does not involve advertising or personal contact with
prospective clients prohibited by Rules 7.2 and 7.3; and
(d) the arrangement does not result in charging a fee that violates Rule
1.5.
Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 107 A.B.A. Rpt. 828, 886-87
(1982) [hereinafter Report of the Kutak Commission]. Although the movement in favor of
law firm diversification dates back to 1980, support for MDPs was already visible in the
1920s. See Report of the Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of Professional Ethics,
52 A.B.A. Rpt. 372, 378 (1927) (noting that "there is substantial difference of view in
the profession respecting its recommendations as to partnerships ... [and] division of
fees."); Minority Report off. W Grinnell, Member of the Special Committee on Supplementing the
Canons of Professional Ethics, 52 A.B.A. Rpt. 387, 388 (1927) (expressing that "aside from
professional policy, I think there is nothing inherently 'unethical' in the formation of
partnerships between lawyers largely engaged in certain kinds of work and an expert
engineer, student of finance, or some other form of expert.").
144. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 579-80 (comparing Kutak Commission's pro-
posal to Model Code).
145. See Kutak Commission Report, supra note 143, at 887 (commenting on Kutak
Commission's proposal). The comment to the Kutak Commission's proposed Rule 5.4
noted that "[g]iven the complex variety of modem legal services, it is impractical to
define broad organizational forms that uniquely can guarantee compliance with the
Rules of Professional Conduct" including problems concerning the client-lawyer rela-
tionship. Id.
146. See id. at 886 (discussing Kutak Commission's proposed Rule 5.4(a)).
147. See id. at 886-87 (discussing Kutak Commission's proposed Rule 5.4(b)).
Model Rule 1.6 forbids a lawyer from revealing information relating to the representa-
tion of a client unless the client consents, the information is revealed to prevent the
client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in immi-
nent death or substantial bodily harm, or the information is revealed by the lawyer to
establish a claim or defense in a controversy with the client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based on the client's conduct, or to
respond to allegations over the lawyer's representation of the client. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 24, Rule 1.6 (governing confidentiality of information).
148. See Kutak Commission Report, supra note 143, at 887 (discussing Kutak Commis-
sion's proposed Rule 5.4(c)). Model Rule 7.2 permits a lawyer to advertise services
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The ABA House of Delegates1 5' dropped the draft proposal
after several objections were raised. 151 One objection was that
the proposal would permit organizations like Sears, Roebuck
and Co., Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., H&R Block, Inc., and
the Big Six accounting firms to open offices to compete with
traditional law firms.1 52 Another objection was that nonlawyer
ownership of law firms would interfere with lawyers' professional
independence.153 A third objection was that nonlawyer law firm
through public media but does not allow a lawyer to give anything of value to a person
for recommending the lawyer's services except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable
costs of advertisements or communications permitted by the Rule and pay the charges
of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or legal service organization. See MODEL
RULES, supra note 24, Rule 7.2 (governing lawyer advertising). Model Rule 7.3 places
restrictions on a lawyer to solicit clients in-person or by telephone when a significant
motive for the solicitation is pecuniary gain, as well as additional limits on client solicita-
tion through written, recorded, in-person, and telephone communications. See id. Rule
7.3 (governing client solicitation).
149. See Kutak Commission Report, supra note 143, at 887 (discussing Kutak Commis-
sion's proposed Rule 5.4(d)). Model Rule 1.5 requires that a lawyer's fees be reason-
able, requires that the lawyer's fee rate be told to the client within a reasonable time,
limits when fees may be charged on a contingency basis, and restricts the division of
fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm. See MODEL RULES, supra note 24,
Rule 1.5 (governing attorney fees).
150. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 912 (explaining ABA House of Dele-
gates ("House of Delegates") is ABA's chief legislative arm and primarily consists of
"lawyers appointed from several sections or other parts of the ABA or elected from state
and local bar associations that, in turn, exercise varying degrees of control over local
lawyers").
151. See Midyear Meeting - House of Delegates - Fourth Session, 108 A.B.A. Rpt. 332,
352-55 (1983) [hereinafter Fourth Session] (summarizing debate surrounding adoption
of Model Rule 5.4); HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 982 (explaining House of
Delegates "dropped" Kutak Commission's draft proposal "at the last minute"); Mun-
neke, supa note 14, at 580 (stating that "[iun the initial skirmish, supporters of the
traditional rules prohibiting lawyers from becoming entangled with nonlegal entities
successfully prevented the adoption of proposed Rule 7.5"). Professor Hazard, the re-
porter for the Kutak Commission, revealed that during the debate before the ABA
House of Delegates "someone asked if . . . [the Kutak] proposal would allow Sears
Roebuck to open a law office. When they found out it would, that was the end of the
debate." See Kaplan, supra note 24, at 1 (quoting Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.).
152. SeeFourth Session, supra note 151, at 352 (noting that someone "asked whether
the proposed rule would permit a business corporation such as Sears or H&R Block to
open law offices staffed by salaried lawyers in shopping centers across the country, and
Professor Hazard responded that it would"); Andrews, supra note 25, at 595 (explaining
Kutak Commission's proposed Model Rule 5.4 successfully opposed in part because it
would permit Sears, Montgomery Ward, H&R Block, or Big Six accounting firms to
establish law practices to compete with law firms).
153. See Fourth Session, supra note 151, at 353 (revealing that someone "suggested
that lay partnerships would ultimately interfere with the exercise of a lawyer's in-
dependent professional judgment"); Andrews, supra note 25, at 595 (noting that Kutak
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ownership would destroy lawyers' ability to be professional.'54 A
fourth objection was that the proposal would have an unknown
but fundamental effect on the legal profession.1 55
In 1986, the North Dakota bar also proposed a more per-
missive rule governing joint ventures between lawyers and
nonlawyers to provide legal services.'5 6 The North Dakota bar's
proposed rule would have permitted fee-sharing and partner-
ships between lawyers and nonlawyers, while maintaining ethical
safeguards, 157 similar to those in D.C. Rule 5.4.158 The North
Dakota Supreme Court, however, rejected the proposal in
1987.159
2. Additional U.S. Ethics Rules Bearing on the Existence
of MDPs
The Model Rules and Model Code contain other rules that
would apply to MDPs.' 61 Some of these rules are directed at law-
yers' nonlegal activities, 1 61 other rules directly limit nonlawyers'
Commission's proposed Model Rule 5.4 successfully opposed, in part because nonlaw-
yer ownership of law firms would interfere with lawyers' professional independence).
154. See Andrews, supra note 25, at 595 (describing objection to Kutak Commis-
sion's proposed Model Rule 5.4 that rule would destroy lawyers' ability to be profes-
sional).
155. See id. (discussing objection to Kutak Commission's proposed Model Rule 5.4
that rule would fundamentally change legal profession).
156. See D.C., North Dakota Bars Recommend New Ethics Rules, 2 Laws. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 23, 449, 463 (Dec. 10, 1986) [hereinafter New Ethics Rules]
(discussing North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct ("North Dakota Rules") pro-
posed Rule 5.4); see also Munneke, supra note 14, at 566 & n.40 (commenting that
restrictive regulations governing joint lawyer-nonlawyer ventures are being replaced
with more permissive rules such as 1986 North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct
proposed Rule 5.4).
157. See New Ethics Rules, supra note 156, at 463 (describing North Dakota pro-
posed Rule 5.4). The North Dakota bar's proposed Rule 5.4 would permit MDPs if:
[T] here is no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judg-
ment or with the client-lawyer relationship, confidential information is pro-
tected, the association does not result in communications about the lawyer or
the lawyer's services in violation of the ethics rules, and the association does
not result in the client being charged a fee in violation of the ethical rules.
Id.
158. See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 104, at 538 (comparing North Dakota
proposed Rule 5.4 to D.C. Rule 5.4).
159. See id. (discussing North Dakota proposed Rule 5.4).
160. See supra notes 25, 26 (listing rules that would apply to joint lawyer-nonlawyer
law activities).
161. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 5.7 (law-related services).
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activities, 16 2 and a few rules address the potential confusion cli-
ents of MDPs would face. 163 The rest of these rules control the
interaction between lawyers and nonlawyers. 164
a. Dual Practice
Dual practice results when a single lawyer or legal services
provider also provides nonlegal services, and thus practices law
and another field. 165 Dual practice, thus, occurs within MDPs
when lawyers and nonlawyers form partnerships to provide legal
and other services and also may occur in traditional law firms. 166
Within the framework of a traditional law firm, dual practice
may occur when lawyers engage in joint practice, such as when a
lawyer qualified in a field besides law practices both to resolve a
client's problem.1 67 Thus, a lawyer who is also a certified public
accountant may counsel a client on legal or accounting matters,
or both.1 6' Historically, many bar members feared joint prac-
tices because it enabled lawyers to improperly refer nonlegal cli-
ents to the law practice. 169 Despite this fear, some jurisdictions
162. See, e.g., id. Rule 5.4(d) (law firm management); id. Rule 5.5(b) (unauthor-
ized practice of law); MODEL CODE, supra note 19, DR 5-107(C) (law firm manage-
ment); id. DR 3-101 (A) (unauthorized practice of law).
163. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 1.6 (confidences); MODEL CODE,
supra note 19, DR 4-101 (same).
164. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rules 1.7(b), 1.8(a) (conflicts of inter-
est); id. Rule 7.2(c) (client referrals); id. Rule 7.3 (client solicitation); id. Rule 5.4 (fee-
sharing); MODEL CODE, supra note 19, DRs 5-101 (A), 5-104(A) (conflicts of interest); id.
DR 2-103(B) (client referrals); id. DR 2-101(B) (client solicitation); id. DR 3-102(A)
(fee-sharing).
165. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 983 (defining dual practice). Dual
practice occurs when "(1) a lawyer, who is also qualified in accounting, engineering or
some other field, holds herself out as practicing in a dual capacity, and (2) a lawyer
forms a partnership with a nonlawyer such as an accountant." Id.
166. See id. (examining dual practice).
167. See id. (defining lawyers also qualified in another profession who hold them-
selves out in dual capacity as engaging in dual practice); Munneke, supra note 14, at 571
(describingjoint practice as situation where "lawyer... is certified in another field such
as accounting, real estate or medicine ... [and] in the course of an interview with one
client, the lawyer may simply change hats, or vice versa.").
168. See Levinson, supra note 5, at 241 ("A person licensed... both as a lawyer and
a certified public accountant (CPA) may appropriately provide accounting advice in
support of the law firm's rendition of legal services and may supervise nonlawyer CPAs
who provide similar accounting advice.").
169. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 571 (noting that while "dual training permits a
lawyer to provide a broader range of services, traditionally it was feared that a dual
practice would allow lawyers to improperly funnel nonlegal clients to the law prac-
tice.").
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replaced the earlier restraints on dual practices with more per-
missive policies.
171
Dual practice also occurs within the traditional law firm
structure when law firms or lawyers own ancillary businesses,
171
such as when law firms open affiliated organizations that employ
nonlawyers and that provide nonlegal services. 1 7 2 For example,
a law firm that owns an organization that employs nonlawyers to
provide financial and regulatory assistance to real estate develop-
ers has an ancillary business.1 73 The key element of an ancillary
business is that the lawyer can control the policy or management
of the nonlegal business, either because the lawyer is actually in
the management of the nonlegal business or because of the law-
yer's financial investment.
174
170. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Op. 549 (1983) (permitting attorney to represent
clients of debt-collection agency in which attorney has financial interest); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1482 (1982) (allowing patent lawyer
to practice law and operate branch office of company that assists investors to obtain and
market patents). Dean Harry J. Haynsworth notes that "[s]ome states . . . in recent
years have issued opinions that downplay the lay control, unauthorized practice and
confidentiality aspects and, at the same time, fashion workable rules with respect to the
solicitation and conflict-of-interest issues." HAYNSWORTH, supra note 25, at 121. The
1969 Model Code's DR 2-102(E) prohibited a lawyer "engaged both in the practice of
law and another profession" from indicating the dual qualifications on a letterhead or
sign. MODEL CODE OF PROFEssioN~A RESPONSIBILTY DR 2-102(E) (1969) (amended
1981). In 1977, however, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Bates v. Arizona, held that the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protected truthful advertising. 433 U.S. 350, 384
(1977). In 1980, the ABA repealed the prohibition. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note
20, at 983 (discussing advertising dual qualifications).
171. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 983 (noting that topic of dual practice
"has become a controversial one within the organized bar under the rubric of 'ancillary
business.'"). The nonlegal business does not have to operate in conjunction with the
law business to qualify as an ancillary business. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 570
(describing ancillary businesses).
172. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 983 (explaining controversy over an-
cillary businesses surrounds law firms that have created affiliated organizations that em-
ploy nonlawyers in consulting activities). The proponents of ancillary businesses assert
that ancillary businesses "serve the needs of clients in the most efficient and cost-effec-
tive manner." See Stephanie B. Goldberg, More than the Law: Ancillay Business Growth
Continues, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 54 (stating that "white paper" signed by 25 law firms
favoring ancillary businesses explained that "these associations of lawyers and non-law-
yers have arisen ... to serve the needs of clients in the most efficient and cost-effective
manner.").
173. See HAzARD,JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 983 (stating that number of major law
firms have ancillary businesses "that employ nonlawyers in various consulting activi-
ties").
174. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 570 (discussing ancillary businesses). A "mere
financial investment in a company, such as the purchase of non-controlling shares of
216 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.21:190
A number of law firms operate ancillary businesses that em-
ploy nonlawyers to provide consulting and other nonlegal serv-
ices."' Washington, D.C.-based law firm Arnold & Porter, for
example, also provided general consulting services 176 and cur-
rently participates in real estate development 177 and financial
services.' 78 Other areas in which law firms have established affili-
ated businesses that offer consulting and other services include
economics, education, management, energy, international busi-
ness, employee benefits, and advertising.1 79
The ABA first considered the ancillary business issue in
1986 when the ABA Commission on Professionalism 180 ("Stanley
stock, would not fall within the scope of [the] ... definition [of ancillary businesses]."
Id. at 570 n.56.
175. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 11, at 983 (discussing law firms with ancil-
lary businesses); Munneke, supra note 14, at 560 (noting that "movement launched by a
significant number of law firms to provide ancillary business services in conjunction
with traditional legal services"). Despite ethics rules that present obstacles to ancillary
businesses, law firms have increasingly engaged in such businesses. See Goldberg, supra
note 172, at 54, 55 (describing 1991 survey that identified 80 to 85 ancillary businesses
operated by law firms compared to 65 in 1989). Many Washington, D.C. law firms en-
tered the ancillary business market partly because clients in D.C. "frequently required
services that transcended the bounds of traditional law practice." Munneke, supra, at
578 & n.111. Although most ancillary businesses are in Washington, D.C., they have
also spread throughout the East and West Coast. See Goldberg, supra, at 54 (revealing
that in 1991 31 ancillary businesses were located in Washington, D.C., 17 in Mid-Atlan-
tic, 10 in Northeast, and 14 on West Coast). Ancillary businesses are not unique to
urban centers, as their use is also common in rural areas. See Munneke, supra, at 578
n.111 (discussing ancillary businesses).
176. See James F. Fitzpatrick, Legal Future Shock: The Role of Large Law Firms by the
End of the Century, 64 IND. L.J. 461, 468-69 (1989) (explaining Arnold & Porter's affili-
ated entity, APCO Associates, is general consulting firm that handles legislative projects
and general business consulting). Arnold & Porter sold APCO in 1991. See Goldberg,
supra note 172, at 54 (discussing APCO).
177. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 176, at 468 (explaining Arnold & Porter's affiliated
entity, MPC Associates, is real estate development consulting firm).
178. See id. at 467-68 (explaining Arnold & Porter's affiliated entity Secura Group
is consulting firm for financial industry).
179. See Andrews, supra note 25, at 625 (surveying law firm ancillary businesses); see
also Goldberg, supra note 172, at 54 (adding that some law firms have ancillary busi-
nesses that conduct environmental consulting and labor relations and public affairs
work).
180. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 580 (explaining ABA Commission on Profes-
sionalism was popularly known as Stanley Commission in recognition of former ABA
presidentJustin Stanley). The ABA Commission on Professionalism ("Stanley Commis-
sion") was formed in 1985 to study the question of professionalism in the bar. See Report
of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association: " ..In the Spirit of Public Service:' A Blueprint for the Rekindling of
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Commission") investigated the question."' 1 Following the inves-
tigation, the Stanley Commission issued a report expressing its
disturbance with the increase in ancillary business activities, be-
cause it was less likely that lawyers could discharge the obliga-
tions imposed by the legal profession.'82 The ABA then created
a Special Coordinating Committee on Professionalism183 ("Spe-
cial Committee") to consider, among other items, lawyer-non-
lawyer business affiliations.' 84 The Special Committee con-
cluded that law firm diversification should be regulated but not
prohibited because there was no evidence that diversification ac-
tually harmed clients, the public, or the profession.8 "
The ABA Litigation Section1 8 6 ("Litigation Section"), how-
ever, advanced the opposite position and presented the ABA
House of Delegates with recommendations prohibiting ancillary
business activities, describing them as contrary to the tenets of
professionalism."8 7 The Litigation Section reported that ancil-
Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 248 (1986) [hereinafter Stanley Commission Report]
(describing Stanley Commission's purpose).
181. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 580 (noting that "first real salvo of present
battle was sounded in 1986" by Stanley Commission).
182. Stanley Commission Report, supra note 180, at 280. The Stanley Commission
reported that it was "disturbed by what it perceives to be an increasing participation by
lawyers in business activities." Id. The Stanley Commission added:
It seems clear to the Commission that the greater the participation by lawyers
in activities other than the practice of law, the less likely it is that the lawyer
can capably discharge the obligations which our profession demands. The
Commission views the trend as disturbing and urges the American Bar Associa-
tion to initiate a study to see what, if any, controls or prohibitions should be
imposed.
Id. at 281.
183. SeeJoint Recommendation and Report to the ABA House of Delegates from the Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and the Special Coordinating Committee on
Professionalism 5 (1990) [hereinafter Joint Recommendation] (explaining Special Coordi-
nating Committee on Professionalism ("Special Committee") created to coordinate
ABA's efforts to maintain lawyer professionalism).
184. See id. at 5-9 (describing Special Committee's mission).
185. See Working Group on Ancillary Business Activities Interim Report to the Special Coor-
dinating Committee on Professionalism 1, 8 (1990) [hereinafter Working Group Report] (dis-
cussing Special Committee's recommendations); Munneke, supra note 14, at 581 (ex-
plaining Special Committee conducted hearings, published newsletter, and discussed
issue and general consensus was that law firm diversification should be regulated but
not prohibited).
186. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 912 (describing ABA Sections). The
ABA "operates primarily through sections that are devoted to many fields of law or law
practice[,]" such as litigation. Id.
187. American Bar Association Litigation Section Report to the House of Delegates 1-2
(1990) [hereinafter Litigation Section Report]; see Munneke, supra note 14, at 581 (analyz-
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lary businesses compromise lawyers' independent judgement
and create conflicts of interest,18 8 threaten the quality of legal
work189 and the reputation of the legal profession, 90 and con-
tribute to the potential loss of the legal profession's self-regula-
tion. 1 9
1
In August 1990, the House of Delegates referred the issue to
ing Litigation Section's report on ancillary businesses). The Litigation Section's Rec-
ommendations stated:
1. A lawyer shall not practice law in a law firm (which shall mean an associa-
tion of two or more attorneys, a partnership or a corporation engaged in
the practice of law), which owns a controlling interest in, or operates, an
entity which provides non-legal services which are ancillary to the practice
of law, or otherwise provides such ancillary non-legal services, except as
provided in Paragraph 4.
2. One or more lawyers who engage in the practice of law in a law firm shall
neither own a controlling interest in, nor operate, an entity which pro-
vides non-legal services which are ancillary to the practice of law, nor
otherwise provide such ancillary non-legal services.
3. Two or more lawyers who engage in the practice of law in separate law
firms shall neither own a controlling interest in, nor operate, an entity
which provides non-legal services which are ancillary to the practice of law,
nor otherwise provide such ancillary services.
4. A lawyer may practice law in a law firm which provides non-legal services
which are ancillary to the practice of law if:
(1) The ancillary services are provided solely to clients of the law firm
and are incidental to, in connection with and concurrent to, the pro-
vision of legal services by the law firm to such clients;
(2) Such ancillary services are provided solely by employees of the law
firm itself and not by a subsidiary or other affiliate of the law firm;
(3) The law firm makes appropriate disclosure in writing to its clients;
and
(4) The law firm does not hold itself out as engaging in any non-legal
activities except in conjunction with the provision of legal services, as
provided in this rule.
5. An individual engaged in the solo practice of law may provide non-legal
services which are ancillary to the practice of law, subject to appropriate
disclosure requirements.
Litigation Section Report, supra, at 1-2.
188. See Litigation Section Report, supra note 187, at 8-10 (asserting that uniting dif-
ferent professional services in one entity compromises lawyers' professional judgment
and creates conflicts of interests because there are economic incentives to recommend
law firms' other services to clients and not to criticize the providers of those services).
189. See id. at 11-13 (arguing that lawyers providing ancillary services are distracted
from and have less time to devote to law practice).
190. See id. at 13-14 (explaining problems that arise with lawyers' ancillary services
negatively impact reputation of legal profession).
191. See id. at 15 (asserting that law firm diversification may justify governmental
regulation of legal profession if lawyers become more like other service providers and
less like professionals with special obligations to society).
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the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility ("Ethics Committee") .192 In 1991, the Ethics Com-
mittee issued a draft proposal for a new Model Rule 5.7 that
would allow law firm subsidiaries to provide ancillary services to
nonclients as long as the lawyers fulfill their professional obliga-
tions toward clients.1"' The Ethics Committee's proposal permit-
ted a law firm to operate an ancillary consulting business or to
hire consultants as firm employees, provided that the consul-
tants were not made partners and that they did not receive a
share of the fees, except through qualifying compensation
plans.194 The Ethics Committee noted that ancillary businesses
raise issues concerning confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and
interference with lawyers' professional judgment.'95 The Ethics
Committee added, however, that ancillary business activities
should not be prohibited because there was no evidence of ac-
tual harm to clients, the public, or the profession resulting from
such activities, that lawyers' professional judgment was not nec-
essarily compromised from ancillary business activities, and that
a complete prohibition against ancillary activities could be un-
192. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 581-82 (explaining House of Delegates de-
clined to adopt Litigation Section's recommendations and instead referred question to
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility in August 1990). The
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility ("Ethics Committee")
was asked to develop necessary amendments to the Model Rules to govern lawyers offer-
ing ancillary services. See Joint Recommendation, supra note 183, at 1 (stating Ethics Com-
mittee's duty).
193. See ABA Rejects Ancillary Business, Inroads on Client Confidences, 60 U.S.L.W.
2121 (Aug. 20, 1991), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, USLW File [hereinafter ABA
Rejects Ancillary Business] (revealing that Ethics Committee's proposal would allow law
firm subsidiaries to provide ancillary services to non-clients, subject to regulations
designed to ensure that lawyers' professional obligations toward clients would not be
impaired). The Ethics Committee's proposal required an ancillary business to inform
customers in writing of the business' relationship to the law firm and that the cus-
tomer's relationship with the business is not that of lawyer-client and required a lawyer
supervising ancillary activities to make reasonable efforts to assure that the ancillary
business' employees' conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the law-
yer. See id. (discussing Ethics Committee's proposed Model Rule 5.7).
194. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 582 (commenting on Ethics Committee's draft
proposal of Model Rule 5.7). One commentator noted that most observers believed
lawyers could already operate ancillary businesses under the Model Rules and Model
Code and that the Ethics Committee's proposal failed to address the issues of fee split-
ting and lawyer-nonlawyer partnerships. Id. at 581.
195. See id. at 583 (noting Ethics Committee's warning of potential ethics
problems with ancillary business activities).
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constitutional.1 9 6 A commentator described the Ethics Commit-
tee's proposal as protecting the economic interests of lawyers
while failing to protect the economic interests of nonlawyer con-
sultants wishing to engage in joint ventures with lawyers because
nonlawyers would not be permitted to become partners in the
law firm or to directly share fees with the lawyers.
197
In 1991, the Litigation Section offered an alternative propo-
sal,' 98 eventually adopted by the ABA House of Delegates as
Model Rule 5.7.199 The Litigation Section's new proposal pro-
hibited a firm from providing ancillary services unless the law
firm employees provided the services to firm clients in connec-
tion with the provision of legal services.2 ° °
In August 1992, the ABA repealed Model Rule 5.7.201 The
repeal occurred before the rule was adopted by any jurisdic-
20tion. 02 The ABA repealed Model Rule 5.7 after general practi-
tioners in smaller cities perceived that the rule might prohibit
their long-standing practice of combining law with other activi-
ties such as title search companies, service on companies' boards
of directors, and real estate development.
203
196. See ABA Rejects Ancillary Business, supra note 193 (citing Ethics Committee
spokesperson).
197. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 582-83 (describing Ethics Committee's propo-
sal as accomplishing anomalous result by protecting economic interests of lawyers but
not protecting "economic interests of nonlawyer consultants, who were prevented from
maximizing the value of their services in the marketplace if they wished to engage in
joint ventures with lawyers" because proposal failed "to address the issues of fee splitting
or nonlawyer partnerships ... [and thus] fell short of permitting nonlawyer investment
in legal services.").
198. See id. at 583 (explaining Litigation Section proposed rule prohibiting law
firms from offering ancillary services, in whatever form, to anyone not already client of
law firm).
199. See ABA Rejects Ancillary Business, supra note 193 (noting that House of Dele-
gates rejected Ethics Committee proposal and adopted Litigation Section's version of
Model Rule governing ancillary businesses, in most controversial issue of House of Del-
egates agenda).
200. See id. (describing Litigation Section proposal). The Litigation Section's rule
"would effectively close the door to most external ancillary businesses, and severely re-
strict in-house provision of ancillary services." Munneke, supra note 14, at 583. The
Litigation Section's new proposal also eliminated an exception for solo-practitioners
under which they could operate ancillary businesses. Id. at 583 n.133.
201. See Randall Samborn & Victoria Slind-Flor, ABA '92: Feminism is Theme, NAT'L
LJ., Aug. 24, 1992, at 1, 34 (explaining Model Rule 5.7 repealed by seven votes at 1992
ABA annual meeting).
202. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 584 (analyzing Model Rule 5.7's repeal).
203. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 985 (describing opposition to Model
Rule 5.7). The Litigation Section's original recommendations against ancillary business
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In 1994, the ABA adopted the current version of Model
Rule 5.7204 to address law-related services. 20 5 Rule 5.7 subjects
lawyers involved with the provision of law-related services to the
Model Rules when the law-related services are provided by the
lawyer in conjunction with legal services.2 °6 A lawyer is also sub-
ject to the Model Rules with respect to the provision of law-re-
lated services if the law-related services are provided by a sepa-
rate entity controlled by the lawyer when the lawyer does not
take reasonable steps to assure that a person obtaining the law-
related services is informed that the law-related services are not
legal services and are not protected by the attorney-client rela-
tionship.
20 7
States have disciplined some lawyers who have used ancillary
activities contained an exception for small towns because the "practice was so en-
trenched." Munneke, supra note 14, at 568 n.45. Small town lawyers have, for some
time, engaged in ancillary business activities that have often been operated out of the
same office as the legal business or they have had office sharing arrangements with
nonlegal businesses and have shared clients and fees. See id. at 568 (discussing practices
of small town lawyers). For example, small town lawyers operate ancillary businesses
such as real estate or insurance agencies, accounting practices, or title companies. See
id. at 568 n.45 (discussing ancillary businesses). Small town lawyers have also entered
into office sharing arrangements with real estate and insurance agencies, sharing office
space, support staff, and other overhead expenses. See id. (discussing office sharing
arrangements).
204. See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 104, at 540 (commenting on current
version of Model Rule 5.7).
205. MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 5.7. Model Rule 5.7 defines law-related
services as "services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in
substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as
unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer." Id. Rule 5.7(b). Exam-
ples of law-related services are: title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust,
real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological
consulting, tax return preparation, patent consulting, medical consulting, and environ-
mental consulting services. See id. Rule 5.7 cmt. (commenting on law-related services).
206. Id. Rule 5.7(a)(1). Rule 5.7(a)(1) states: "A lawyer shall be subject to the
Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services.., if
the law-related services are provided .. .by the lawyer in circumstances that are not
distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients ...." Id.
207. See id. Rule 5.7(a)(2) (governing disclosure in connection with law-related
services). Model Rule 5.7(a)(2) states:
"A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to
the provision of law-related services ... if the law-related services are provided:
... by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if
the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining
the law-related services knows that the services of the separate entity are not
legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not
exist."
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businesses as a source of clients. 20 Disciplinary officials, how-
ever, have often ignored the practice of referring ancillary busi-
ness clients to the law practice as long as lawyers' conduct was
not egregious. 2 9 The relaxation of the rules surrounding ancil-
lary business has served a practical purpose in small towns where
there may not be enough legal work to sustain lawyers full-
time.2 1 ° Without the relaxed rules, lawyers would not settle in
these areas and access to legal services would diminish.211 The
rules, however, have been enforced in urban areas because the
above justification does not exist.212  The result has been a
double standard of enforcement of the rules governing ancillary
business activities.213
Opponents of ancillary business activities argue that ancil-
lary businesses raise ethical concerns.21 4 These opponents claim
that ancillary businesses compromise lawyers' independentjudg-
208. See, e.g., In re Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76, 79, 86 (Alaska 1974) (affirming suspen-
sion of attorney suspended in part because used ancillary business organized to act as
agent in obtaining oil and gas leases as source of clients for legal practice); Florida Bar
v. Curry, 211 So. 2d 169, 170, 172 (Fla. 1968) (affirming recommendation of suspension
of attorney/accountant for soliciting for legal work clients advised on tax matters); In
re Miller, 131 N.E.2d 91, 95, 97 (Ill. 1955) (affirming recommendation of suspension of
attorney who used trademark search service to solicit clients for legal practice).
209. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 568 (explaining disciplinary officials' response
to practice of referring ancillary business clients to law practice).
210. See HAYNSWORTH, supra note 25, at 80 (explaining supplementing law practice
income with ancillary business may be "necessary for survival, particularly in small towns
and rural areas where law practice is economically marginal").
211. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 568 (stating that permitting lawyers to supple-
ment law practice income by engaging in ancillary businesses with nonlawyers has made
legal services available to people who otherwise would not have access to lawyers).
212. See id. at 568-69 (noting that in larger communities there is enough legal
work to sustain full-time law practices).
213. See id. (explaining result of disparate enforcement of rules governing ancil-
lary business activities). One commentator notes that
[i]ronically, the same ethical considerations confront both the sole practi-
tioner and the large law firm partner. Problems involving loyalty, confidential-
ity, and solicitation apply with equal force to the small and large firm. The
only distinctions between the two lie in the economic stakes. If small firms
and sole practitioners are able to engage in ancillary business activities without
violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, then large firms should be able to
do the same.
Id. at 569.
214. See id. at 576 (stating that opponents of ancillary businesses denounce them
as threatening legal profession's traditional values); HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at
983 (explaining opponents of ancillary businesses "charge that these activities raise seri-
ous professionalism concerns").
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ment,215 endanger confidentiality, 16 create conflicts of inter-
ests,2 17 and generally produce opportunities for lawyers to vio-
late ethics rules.218 In addition, the opponents of ancillary busi-
ness activities fear that permitting these activities will lead to
nonlawyer influence over, control, or even ownership of law
firms,219 will sidetrack lawyers from their professional responsi-
bilities, 220 will motivate nonlawyer enterprises to lobby for per-
mission to offer legal services,2 2 1 will exert pressure on clients to
215. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 983 (exploring debate over whether
ancillary businesses compromise lawyers' independent judgment). A law firm that
makes an economic commitment to nonlaw personnel may lose its "objectivity in advis-
ing the client (a) whether a nonlaw expert is needed, (b) if so, who that expert should
be, and (c) if an expert is retained, whether the person is rendering satisfactory services
at a fair price .... Levinson, supra note 5, at 242. The potential negative effect on
objectivity may lead third parties to reject or doubt the law firm's work product. See id.
(analyzing potential effects of compromising lawyers' independent judgment).
216. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 983 (discussing controversy over
whether ancillary businesses endanger confidentiality). There is a risk that "the con-
duct of nonlawyers will not be governed by coherent, enforceable standards which are
compatible with lawyers' standards on ... confidentiality... " Levinson, supra note 5,
at 242.
217. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 983 (examining disagreement over
whether ancillary businesses endanger confidentiality). There is a risk that "the con-
duct of nonlawyers will not be governed by coherent, enforceable standards which are
compatible with lawyers' standards on . . . conflicts of interest . " Levinson, supra
note 5, at 242.
218. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 571 (explaining ancillary businesses pose po-
tential threat "to the integrity of the legal profession because it exposes lawyers to an
opportunity to violate their professional ethics[,]" such as transgressing rules concern-
ing unauthorized practice of law, conflicts of interest, confidentiality, and client solicita-
tion).
219. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 983 (explaining fear that ancillary
businesses pave way for "nonlawyer ownership of or participation in law firms."); Law-
rence J. Fox, Restraint is Good in Trade; Ancillary Business for Lawyers Needs Limits, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 29, 1991, at 17 (explaining "ancillary business movement introduces non-law-
yers into positions of influence and control of the profession" because "those who come
to prominence and success in the operations of the ancillary business will end up with
real power in the governance of the overall enterprise.").
220. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 983 (analyzing debate over whether
ancillary businesses "distract lawyers from their professional responsibilities as law-
yers."); Fox, supra note 219, at 17 (stating that in today's complex legal world "it is all
lawyers can do to maintain our level of competence by devoting full time to the practice
of law."). The risk that the law firm or the lawyers will be distracted from the practice of
law creates a risk of "impaired competence and diligence of lawyers . Levinson,
supra note 5, at 242.
221. See Fox, supra note 219, at 17 (explaining "if lawyers enter other fields of
endeavor, non-lawyer enterprises such as Household Finance, Coldwell Banker, Ameri-
can Express and WalMart are likely to wish to add legal services to their array of con-
sumer products.").
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use the firm's ancillary services, 222 and will eventually lead to an
end to the legal profession's self-regulation. 223 At least one op-
ponent believes that law firms establish ancillary businesses as a
source of profits. 2
2 4
Proponents of ancillary business activities answer that these
activities are not different from those traditionally engaged in by
lawyers, 25 that clients benefit in many ways from the additional
services, 226 and that dangers with confidentiality and conflicts of
222. See id. (stating that power inherent in lawyer-client relationship would pres-
sure client to use lawyer's firm's ancillary services because client "(a) will not want to
offend his or her lawyer; (b) will be concerned he or she will become a second-class
citizen at the law firm if the law firm's consultant is not hired; and (c) will be over-
whelmingly influenced by the confidence the client wants to place in his or her attor-
ney."). One commentator notes that 60% of the customers of Washington, D.C.-based
law firm Arnold & Porter's ancillary business, Secura Group, "have become clients of
the firm." Id.
223. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 983 ("Opponents of ancillary business
activity fear that this 'business' activity will ... ultimately lead to a displacement of self-
regulation."); Stanley L. Chauvin, Jr., A Conscientious Conclusion: Ancillary Business too
Risky for Clients and Lauyers 76 A.B.A. J. 8, 8-9 (1990) (stating that "mixing of law prac-
tice with non-law businesses could open the flood gates for outside regulation of the
profession."). Short of the legal profession losing its self-regulating powers, there is a
risk "that society will perceive the legal profession as moving into nonlaw businesses
through unfair use of its privileged position (including use of information received in
confidence from clients) and that society will react by revoking some privileges or
otherwise curtailing the independence of the legal profession;" or a risk "that society
will perceive the legal profession as neglecting the practice of law despite a huge unmet
need for legal services and that society will react by revoking some privileges such as our
monopoly over the rendition of legal services... ." Levinson, supra note 5, at 243. One
opponent of ancillary services states:
The assertion that lawyers should be self-regulating because anything else
would undermine their ability to protect the individual from the potential op-
pressiveness of the government carries precious little force when it appears
that a more important goal is protecting the individual from the potential
abuses inherent in the law firm conglomerate peddling insurance or financial
investment advisory services to its client-customers.
Fox, supra note 219, at 17.
224. See Chauvin, Jr., supra note 223, at 9 (commenting on ancillary businesses).
The former ABA President wrote: "I truly doubt that the lawyers who create ancillary
businesses are motivated by a desire to serve clients or the public more effectively and at
a lower cost. The risk of putting the lawyer-client relationship in jeopardy appears
more likely to be motivated by profit." Id.
225. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 984 (listing arguments in defense of
ancillary businesses).
226. See id. (explaining benefits derived by clients of law firms with ancillary busi-
nesses). One commentator explains that the benefits to the clients of firms that pro-
vide nonlegal services in conjunction with the practice of law include:
(1) [T] he convenience of one-stop shopping, (2) the intellectual benefit of an
ongoing relationship between the lawyers and nonlaw experts in the firm, (3)
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interests are adequately protected by professional rules.2 2 7 At
least one proponent of ancillary services asserts that the
problems arising from the use of in-house nonlawyer specialists
are the same as those that arise from the use of specialists from
outside the law firm.22s Some commentators argue that rules re-
stricting ancillary businesses are a form of economic protection-
ism2 29 and that lawyers oppose ancillary business activities be-
the ease and speed in selecting nonlaw experts, (4) the possible fee savings if
the nonlaw experts provide brief consultations without having to be called in
from the outside, and (5) the possible fee savings and maximization of quality
resulting from the operation of a freely competitive market.
Levinson, supra note 5, at 242. A proponent of ancillary services adds that
the use of in-house specialists is preferable because it is more cost-effective for
the client and often more efficient. But equally important .... the regular day-
to-day interaction and coordination between lawyers and non-lawyer profes-
sionals tend to generate better business solutions to complex problems than
either group could develop on its own. In many situations, their joint efforts
produce better arguments, richer analysis and sounder advice.
James W. Jones, Law Firm Diversification: Is it the Wave of the Future?, A.B.A.J., Sept. 1989,
at 52.
227. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 984 (listing arguments in defense of
ancillary businesses). The managing partner of Arnold & Porter and proponent of
ancillary activities asserts that:
The practice of law . . .has become far more complex and diverse in
recent years than could have been imagined even 20 years ago.
The growing complexity of both the law and the economic and social
activities that the law attempts to regulate increasingly requires lawyers, in the
course of representation, to understand and apply the precepts of other disci-
plines.
These demands have led to the use of non-lawyer professionals, working in
tandem with (and often at the direction of) lawyers in analyzing client
problems, structuring transactions and managing litigation....
In the past 10 years or so, law firms of all sizes with practice areas requir-
ing interdisciplinary collaboration have begun to bring these services in-house
by hiring non-lawyer professionals in areas ranging from economics and inter-
national trade to engineering and health care, from accounting and social
work to lobbying and family counseling.
Sometimes, these lawyers have been hired as employees of the law firms;
in other cases, the firms have established separate companies to make these
services available. But in all cases the motivation has been to improve the
quality of service to clients by assuring that complex matters requiring interdis-
ciplinary skills can be handled efficiently and economically.
Jones, supra note 226, at 52.
228. See Jones, supra note 226, at 52 (arguing in favor of ancillary businesses). Mr.
Jones adds that "when undertaken with the informed consent of the client and with due
regard for conflicts of interest and other ethical issues, the use of in-house specialists
actually enhances the caliber of the service that lawyers render." Id.
229. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 577 & n.100 (stating that important basis for
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cause they are in direct competition with law firms that have an-
cillary businesses.230
b. Conflicts of Interest
Lawyers practicing in MDPs face potential conflicts of inter-
est problems.23 ' For example, a lawyer in an MDP may feel pres-
sure to refer a client to other professionals in the same firm
although the client may be better served by someone outside the
firm.2 1 2 The Model Rules prohibit a lawyer from representing a
client if the client's representation may be materially limited by
the lawyer's interests or by the lawyer's responsibilities to others,
unless the client consents and the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation of the client will not be adversely affected.2 ' In
addition, the Model Rules forbid a lawyer from transacting busi-
ness with a client or acquiring an adverse ownership, possessory,
security, or other pecuniary interest to that of a client unless the
transaction is fair and reasonable to the client and the lawyer
discloses the information to the client.234 Similarly, the Model
rules restricting ancillary businesses is economic protectionism); see also Andrews, supra
note 25, at 622 (noting "economic protectionism ... undoubtedly has played an impor-
tant role in practice in preserving the business restrictions on lay involvement").
230. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 577 (explaining perhaps issue in dispute with
ancillary business activities is economic, because law firms without ancillary businesses
compete directly with firms that have "pursued more aggressive policies of attracting
and servicing clients").
231. See HAZARD, JR. & HODES, supra note 27, at 471 (revealing potential ethics
problems with lawyer-nonlawyer law partnerships).
232. See Litigation Section Report, supra note 187, at 9 (discussing conflicts of inter-
ests faced by lawyers practicing law in partnerships with nonlawyers). With respect to
MDPs that practice accounting and law, some practitioners claim there are potentially
serious conflicts of interest problems. See Dillon & Griffiths, supra note 3, at 27 (exam-
ining conflicts of interest implications of auditing firm routinely handling clients' legal
and tax work).
233. MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 1.7(b). Model Rule 1.7(b) states:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multi-
ple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.
Id.
234. Id. Rule 1.8(a). Model Rule 1.8(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
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Code forbids a lawyer from representing a client, absent full dis-
closure and the client's consent, if the lawyer's financial, busi-
ness, property, or personal interests will or reasonably may affect
the lawyer's professional judgment. 235  In addition, the Model
Code instructs a lawyer not to enter into a business transaction
with a client if they will hold differing interests and the client
expects the lawyer to represent the client in that transaction, un-
less the lawyer fully discloses the lawyer's position to the client
and the client consents. 23 6
c. Client Referrals and Solicitation
Another potential ethics problem with MDPs consists of law-
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse
to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmit-
ted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably under-
stood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of in-
dependent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
Id. Lawyers may serve on the boards of directors of clients, although a variety of
problems may arise. See Levinson, supra note 5, at 252 (explaining "[1] awyers who serve
as officers or directors of their corporate clients cause numerous difficulties and uncer-
tainties."). Lawyers who serve as officers or directors of their corporate clients create a
risk that other board members
may not know if the lawyer-director is speaking as lawyer or director; the law-
yer-director may be called as a material witness to matters in which that person
participated as a director, and may consequently be disqualified from continu-
ing to serve as a lawyer; in corporate takeover situations, the loyalties of the
lawyer-director may be divided between the old management and the corpora-
tion which may benefit from a change in management. The lawyer-director
may also deprive the corporation of participation in a free market for legal
services by depriving other law firms of fair access to the opportunity to render
legal services to those clients. And as a practical matter, the law firm itself
incurs a high level of exposure to disqualification from litigation, discharge by
the client, and civil liability arising from its members' involvement in the busi-
ness of the client.
Id. at 253.
235. MODEL CODE, supra note 19, DR 5-101(A). Model Code DR 5-101 (A) states
that "[e]xcept with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not
accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client
will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or per-
sonal interests." Id.
236. Id. DR 5-104(A). DR 5-104(A) states: "A lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client if they have differing interests therein and if the client expects
the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment therein for the protection of the client,
unless the client has consented after full disclosure." Id.
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yers using nonlawyer partners to solicit clients in attempts to cir-
cumvent rules restricting in-person solicitation of clients. 7
Model Rule 7.3 generally prohibits lawyers from soliciting pro-
spective clients in-person or by telephone. 38 Rule 7.2 forbids a
lawyer from paying anyone to refer clients to the lawyer, except
through not-for-profit lawyer referral services or legal service or-
ganizations.239
Under the Model Code, lawyers may not recommend their
firms to laypersons unless the laypersons first seek advice regard-
ing employment of a lawyer from the lawyer.24" The Model
Code, in addition, forbids a lawyer from compensating a person
237. See Litigation Section Report, supra note 187, at 34 (analyzing problems with
nonlawyer client solicitation in MDPs); HAZARD, JR. & HODES, supra note 27, at 471
(examining improper solicitation of clients); Munneke, supra note 14, at 566 (explain-
ing ethics rules restricting in-person solicitation of business limits lawyers' dealings with
nonlawyers). Nonlawyer partners of MDPs could potentially initiate contacts with pro-
spective clients with the intent to solicit business for the ancillary business and the law
practice. Litigation Section Report, supra, at 34.
238. MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 7.3. Model Rule 7.3 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit profes-
sional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no
family or prior professional relationship when a significant motive for the law-
yer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospective cli-
ent by... in-person or telephone contact even when not otherwise prohibited
by paragraph (a), if:
(2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment.
Id.
239. Id. Rule 7.2(c). Model Rule 7.2(c) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not give
anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services except that a
lawyer may ... pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or legal
service organization .... Id. Model Rule 7.2(c) generally prohibits a lawyer from
paying "another person for channeling professional work." Id. Rule 7.2 cmt. The rule,
however,
does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from adver-
tising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid agency or pre-
paid legal services plan may pay to advertise legal services provided under its
auspices. Likewise, a lawyer may participate in not-for-profit lawyer referral
programs and pay the usual fees charged by such programs.
Id.
240. See MODEL CODE, supra note 19, DR 2-103(A) (governing recommendation of
professional employment). Model Code DR 2-103(A) explains that "[a] lawyer shall
not, except as authorized in DR 2-101 (B), recommend employment as a private practi-
tioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a layperson who has not sought his advice
regarding employment of a lawyer." Id. DR 2-101(B) permits a lawyer to publish or
broadcast certain information "in print media distributed or over television or radio
broadcast" in specified geographic areas. Id. DR 2-101 (B).
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or organization for referring clients to the lawyer.241  The lawyer
may, however, pay legal aid or other legal services organizations
for referrals.242
d. Confidences
Multi-discipline practices threaten confidentiality because
there is a serious risk that nonlawyers will learn client confi-
dences 243 or that nonlawyer partners subject to confidentiality
rules will inadvertently waive the attorney-client privilege.244
Model Rule 1.6 generally forbids lawyers from revealing client
confidences unless authorized by the client or necessary for rep-
resentation of the client.245 Model Code DR 4-101 also generally
prohibits a lawyer from revealing the client's confidences or
secrets.
24 6
241. See id. DR 2-103(B) (governing recommendation of professional employ-
ment). DR 2-103(B) states in part: "A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of
value to a person or organization to recommend or secure his employment by a client,
or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in his employment by a
client . . . ." Id.
242. See id. DR 2-103(B), (D) (governing recommendation of professional employ-
ment). DR 2-103(B) does permit a lawyer to "pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues
charged by any of the organizations listed in DR 2-103(D)." Id. DR 2-103(B). DR 2-
103(D) permits a lawyer to be recommended by organizations that promote the law-
yer's services if there is no interference with the lawyer's exercise of independent pro-
fessional judgment, such as legal aid offices, lawyer referral services associated with bar
associations and other legal-referral services or prepaid legal services plans. Id. DR 2-
103(D).
243. See HAZARD, JR. & HODES, supra note 27, at 470 (discussing potential problem
with breaches of confidentiality in MDPs); Munneke, supra note 14, at 566 (explaining
rules protecting client confidences necessarily limit lawyers' dealings with nonlawyers).
244. See Litigation Section Report, supra note 187, at 32 (discussing inadvertent
waiver of attorney-client privilege by nonlawyer partners). Nonlawyer partners "may in
effect make judgments concerning privilege issues without realizing the precise issues
and implications involved." Id. In fact, the attorney-client privilege issues are difficult
"even for experienced lawyers with professional training in legal ethics and with years of
legal practice behind them .... " Id.
245. MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 1.6. Model Rule 1.6(a) states that "[a]
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the cli-
ent consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation . . . ." Id. Rule 1.6(a). The comment adds that
"[1]awyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other
information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particu-
lar information be confined to specified lawyers." Id. Rule 1.6 cmt.
246. MODEL CODE, supra note 19, DR 4-101. DR 4-101 defines "confidence" as "in-
formation protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law" and defines
"secret" as "other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has
requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
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e. Unauthorized Practice of Law
Multi-discipline practices potentially increase nonlawyers' vi-
olations of unauthorized practice of law rules and place their
lawyer counterparts at risk of assisting the violation. 247 For ex-
ample, clients of MDPs may ask nonlawyer partners for advice
that neither may realize constitutes legal advice. 248 The Model
Rules prohibit lawyers from assisting nonlawyers to practice
law.249 The Model Code's restrictions are similar to those con-
tained in the Model Rules.25 °
The prohibition against aiding nonlawyers to practice law
was promulgated to protect the public from unqualified per-
sons.251  The definition of practice of law, however, is deter-
mined by law and thus differs across jurisdictions.252 State bar
associations have developed broad definitions of practice of law
so that nonlawyers are left with a very small sphere of activity. 25 3
be likely to be detrimental to the client." Id. DR 4-101(A). DR 4-101 states that "a
lawyer shall not knowingly... [r]eveal a confidence or secret of his client[;] ... [u]se a
confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client[;] . .. [or] [ulse a
confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third person,
unless the client consents after full disclosure." Id. DR 4-101 (B). A lawyer, however,
"may reveal ... [c]onfidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients af-
fected, but only after full disclosure to them." Id. DR 4-101(C) (1). Finally, "[a] lawyer
shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, associates, and others whose
services are utilized by him from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of a client
.. Id. DR 4-101(D).
247. See HAZARD, JR. & HODES, supra note 27, at 470 (commenting on unauthor-
ized practice of law risks in lawyer-nonlawyer law partnerships); Munneke, supra note
14, at 566 (explaining prohibitions on unauthorized practice of law, among other re-
strictions, have prevented nonlawyers from providing legal services).
248. See Litigation Section Report, supra note 187, at 31 (discussing potential unau-
thorized practice of law violations in MDPs).
249. See MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 5.5 (governing unauthorized practice
of law). Model Rule 5.5 states that "[a] lawyer shall not: ... assist a person who is not a
member of the bar in the ... unauthorized practice of law." Id. Rule 5.5(b).
250. See MODEL CODE, supra note 19, DR 3-101 (A) (governing unauthorized prac-
tice of law). Model Code DR 3-101 (A) provides that a "lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer
in the unauthorized practice of law." Id. The prohibition against aiding nonlawyers in
the practice of law originated in ABA Canon 47. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
supra note 118, Canon 47 (stating that "[n]o lawyer shall permit his professional serv-
ices, or his name, to be used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of
law by any law agency, personal or corporate").
251. See MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 5.5 cmt. (explaining limit on practice of
law to members of bar protects public from rendition of legal services by unqualified
persons).
252. See id. (commenting on unauthorized practice of law).
253. See Kelly C. Crabb, Note, Providing Legal Services in Foreign Countries: Making
Room for the American Attorney, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1767, 1781 (1983) (explaining in
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f. Fee-Sharing
Rules governing the sharing of fees received for legal serv-
ices between lawyers and nonlawyers affect MDPs. 254 Model Rule
5.4 generally prohibits lawyers from sharing fees for legal serv-
ices with nonlawyers. 255 The Model Code also generally prohib-
its a lawyer or law firm from sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer,
except in specified situations.25 16  One commentator, however,
does not believe that fee-sharing with nonlawyers impairs the in-
dependence of the law firm and urges that f'ee-sharing be per-
mitted so long as nonlawyers are not given equity interest or a
managerial role in the law firm.2 5 7
United States state bar associations have influenced development of broad definition of
practice of law, leaving narrow scope of activity for nonlawyers).
254. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 5.4(a) (prohibiting fee-sharing
between lawyers and nonlawyers).
255. Id. Model Rule 5.4(a) states:
A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associ-
ate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period
of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or
more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or dis-
appeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to
the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon
purchase price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compen-
sation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or
in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
Id.
256. See MODEL CODE, supra note 19, DR 3-102(A) (governing sharing of legal
fees). DR 3-102(A) generally provides:
A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer, except that:
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with his firm, partner, or associate may
provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time
after his death, to his estate or to one or more specified persons.
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a
deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that
proportion of the total compensation which Fairly represents the
services rendered by the deceased lawyer.
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include non-lawyer employees in a com-
pensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in
whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement providing such
plan does not circumvent another disciplinary rule.
Id.
257. Levinson, supra note 5, at 241. Professor Levinson adds that "the existing
rules tend.., to discourage the employment of nonlawyer experts by prohibiting law-
yers from sharing fees with nonlawyers." Id.
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g. Law Firm Management
Finally, ethics rules addressing the management of law firms
by nonlawyers impact MDPs as Model Rule 5.4(d) forbids lawyers
from practicing in organizations that have nonlawyer corporate
directors or officers, or that give nonlawyers the right to direct
or control lawyers' professional judgment. 258 The Model Code
has the same restrictions as the Model Rules. 259 The restrictions
are designed to prevent nonlawyers from interfering with law-
yers' professional judgment.260 Despite these restrictions, some
law firms that recognize the value of professional management
have hired nonlawyers as office managers. 261' The nonlawyer of-
fice managers' authority, however, is limited by the ethical re-
strictions on nonlawyer involvement. 26 2  One commentator
warns that nonlawyer managers inevitably obtain control over
important firm policy decisions. 2 63
3. Discussion of England's Rules Governing Law Firm
Ownership and MDPs
In Great Britain, the Law Society's Solicitors' Rules Rule 7
does not permit solicitors to practice law in partnership with
non-solicitors.2 64 Solicitors' Rules Rule 7 prevents practitioners
from forming MDPs by governing the sharing of fees.265 Rule 7
generally prohibits solicitors from sharing their professional fees
with non-solicitors. 26 6 The Law Society's Rules, however, permit
258. MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 5.4(d).
259. See MODEL CODE, supra note 19, DR 5-107(c); (governing law firm manage-
ment).
260. See Andrews, supra note 25, at 629 (describing reason for restriction).
261. See id. at 628 (discussing law firm management by nonlawyers).
262. See id. at 629 (explaining Model Rule 5.4(d) limits nonlawyer office manag-
ers' scope of management). The restrictions on law firm management by nonlawyers
seem to "preclude a nonlawyer from having any real authority over decisions that mat-
ter to the firm's financial well-being." Id.
263. Munneke, supra note 14, at 573. Professor Munneke warns that control over
law firms' policy decisions "may constitute control over the lawyers' independent pro-
fessional judgment." Id.
264. See SILVER.N, supra note 33, at 130 (stating that "[a] solicitor is not permit-
ted to practice in partnership with a person who is not a solicitor[;] ... [t]o do so would
involve the solicitor in a breach of Rule 7 Solicitors' Practice Rules 1990"); Godfrey &
Damerell, supra note 4, at 72 (explaining professional rules promulgated by Law Society
do not permit MDPs).
265. SoulICToRs' RULES, supra note 36, Rule 7(1).
266. See id. (governing sharing of legal fees); SILVERMAN, supra note 33, at 75 (ex-
plaining Solicitors' Rules Rule 7 "prevents a solicitor from entering into partnership
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solicitors to establish profit-sharing schemes for employees.26 7
In 1990, section sixty-six of the Courts and Legal Services
Act2 68 repealed section thirty-nine of the Solicitors Act 1974,269
which had prohibited MDPs by forbidding solicitors from acting
as agents for unqualified persons.2 70 The Courts and Legal Serv-
ices Act, in addition, transferred rulemaking authority in this
area to the Law Society. 271 Under the Courts and Legal Services
with any person except another qualified solicitor or registered lawyer since he may not
share his fees with such a person"). Solicitors' Rules Rule 7(1) prohibits solicitors from
sharing or agreeing to share their professional fees with any person other than:
(a) a solicitor;
(b) a person who is entitled to practise as a lawyer in any country other than
England and Wales and has not been struck off or suspended from the
register of foreign lawyers;
(c) the solicitor's bona fide employee, which provision shall not permit a
partnership with a non-solicitor under the cloak of employment; or
(d) a retired partner or predecessor of the solicitor or the dependents or
personal representatives of the deceased partner or predecessor.
SOLICITORS' RULES, supra, Rule 7(1).
267. See SOLICITORS' RULES, supra note 6, Rule 7(1) (c) (governing profit-sharing
schemes for employees); SILVE, ft-N, supra note 33, at 75 (noting that exceptions con-
tained in Solicitors' Rules Rule 7 "allow solicitors to maintain profit-sharing or bonus
schemes for their employees").
268. Courts and Legal Services Act § 66.
269. Solicitors Act § 39.
270. See Solicitors Act § 39 (governing solicitors acting as agents). The repealed
act stated in part:
(1) No solicitor shall willfully or knowingly-
(a) act as agent for an unqualified person in any action or in any matter
in bankruptcy;
(b) permit his name to be made use of in any action or in any matter in
bankruptcy upon the account or for the profit of an unqualified
person;
(d) do any other act enabling an unqualified person to appear, act or
practise in any respect as a solicitor in any action or in any matter in
bankruptcy.
(4) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that in subsection (1)
references to an unqualified person include references to a body corpo-
rate.
Solicitors Act § 39. An 'unqualified person' is someone who does not meet the qualifi-
cations of section 1 Solicitors Act 1974, which states: "No person shall be qualified to act
as a solicitor unless - (a) he has been admitted as a solicitor, and (b) his name is on
the roll, and (c) he has in force a certificate issued by the Society... authorising him to
practise as a solicitor . . . ." Solicitors Act § 1.
271. See Courts and Legal Services Act § 66(2) (transferring authority to Law Soci-
ety); David Waller, Growing Places, LEGAL Bus., July/Aug. 1991, 15, 17 (stating that
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Act, therefore, the Law Society is authorized to promulgate rules
that permit solicitors to enter into partnerships with non-solici-
tors.27 2 Despite the permissive Courts and Legal Services Act,
the Law Society has not eliminated the ban on MDPs.273 As a
result of the Law Society's restrictions, in England solicitors may
not enter into partnerships with accountants, insurers, or other
professionals to provide services.2 74 The restriction persists de-
spite a number of solicitors favoring rules that would permit
MDPs.275
The Law Society and some solicitors oppose MDPs on the
grounds that MDPs are not in the public interest.2 76 The restric-
tion was created to protect clients and consumers of legal serv-
* 27ices.2 7 Solicitors' Rules Rule 7 is intended to preserve solicitors'
Courts and Legal Services Act allowed Law Society to set its own rules). Section 66(2)
of the Courts and Legal Services Act states: "Nothing in subsection (1) prevents the Law
Society making rules which prohibit solicitors from entering into any unincorporated
association with persons who are not solicitors, or restrict the circumstances in which
they may do so." Id. The Lord Chancellor, involved in enacting the Courts and Legal
Services Act, while addressing the Law Society's authority to eliminate the ban on
MDPs, explained: "We are not encouraging the Law Society in any way but merely mak-
ing clear that it has this power and that it is for the Society to decide in its professional
judgment to decide what is right ...." See Way Cleared for MDPs, L. Soc'Y's GAZETTE,
Feb. 7, 1990, at 7 (quoting Lord Chancellor's remarks that Courts and Legal Services
Act authorizes Law Society to eliminate prohibition against MDPs).
272. See SILVERMAN, supra note 33, at 131 (noting that section 66 of Courts and
Legal Services Act permits Law Society to make rules that allow solicitors to enter into
unincorporated association with non-solicitors). Similar provisions authorize the gov-
erning bodies for notaries and barristers to promulgate rules that allow notaries and
barristers to enter into unincorporated association with non-notaries and non-barris-
ters, respectively. See Courts and Legal Services Act §§ 66(4)-(6).
273. See SILVERMAN, supra note 33, at 131 (explaining Courts and Legal Services
Act section 66 "has not yet been brought into force"); Waller, supra note 271, at 17
(noting that Law Society has continued prohibiting MDPs).
274. See Patten, supra note 37, at 27 (discussing Law Society's prohibition of
MDPs).
275. See Godfrey & Damerell, supra note 4, at 73 (revealing that recent survey indi-
cated that 54% of solicitors who responded to survey favored relaxation of ban on
MDPs). The solicitors in favor of relaxing the ban on MDPs thought it "advantageous
to obtain under the same roof the services of other professionals such as accountants,
surveyors, barristers, patent agents and foreign lawyers." Id. Another recent survey of
579 law firms by the Law Society revealed that more than a third of the firms surveyed
had discussed the issue of MDPs at the partnership level and over 70% of those firms
were in favor of MDPs. See Editorial, MDP-minded, L. Soc'v's GUARDIAN GAZETTE, Dec.
13, 1996, at 15 [hereinafter MDP-Minded] (detailing results of Law Society survey on
MDPs).
276. See Frank E. Maher, Practising in Partnership, L. Soc'v's GAZETTE, Sept. 18,
1991, at 2 (examining opposition to MDPs).
277. See A Full Quota of Challenge and Excitement: President's Address to the 1988 Na-
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independence and to sustain their ability to offer their clients
impartial advice.278 The prohibition against MDPs, in addition,
continues because of concerns involving the solicitor-client rela-
tionship, conflicts of interests, legal privilege, and the practice of
law by unqualified persons. 279 The Government, however, elimi-
nated the statutory ban on MDPs with the Courts and Legal Serv-
ices Act because there no longer existed strong public interest
justifications for the restriction. 28 0  Furthermore, at least one
commentator asserts that the opposition from the legal profes-
sion is generated by fear.21
In May 1991, Great Britain's Department of Trade and In-
dustry proposed lifting the ban on partnerships of more than
twenty people.282 At least one commentator and some members
of accounting firms believe the Law Society is on the verge of
allowing MDPs.2s3 If the Law Society fails to relax the rules
prohibiting MDPs, the Law Society may have to prove to the Gov-
ernment that the restrictions are not anticompetitive. 2 4  The
Law Society established a steering group to address the concerns
tional Conference, L. Soc'Y's GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 1988, at 2 (quoting president of Law Soci-
ety saying that debate over MDPs "is an issue of client and consumer protection").
278. See Godfrey & Damerell, supra note 4, at 73 (revealing purposes behind
Rule(7)); SiLVERMAN, supra note 33, at 131 ("The existence of this prohibition stems
from the profession's concern to maintain the independence of solicitors.").
279. See SILVERMAN, supra note 33, at 131 (analyzing reasons ban on MDPs has
continued in England).
280. See Green Papers - Legal Profession Faces Radical Revamp: Work, Education and
Organization, L. Soc'v's GAzEicrr, Feb. 1, 1989, at 4 [hereinafter Legal Profession Faces
Radical Revamp] (explaining Green Paper argues that "[t]here are no strong public
interest reasons justifying such restrictions any longer.").
281. See Maher, supra note 276, at 2 (discussing motives behind lawyers' opposition
to MDPs).
282. See Waller, supra note 271, at 17 (discussing Department of Trade and Indus-
try's proposal to permit partnerships of more than twenty people to form MDPs).
283. See, e.g. All the Rage, supra note 3, at 11 (noting that with "the previously ob-
structive Law Society about to relent, multi-disciplinary partnerships may well be the
coming thing for some enterprising accountants."); Bassirian, supra note 3, at 2 (ex-
plaining Big Six firms have begun recruiting lawyers directly out of school "in anticipa-
tion of possible changes to current rules barring MDPs.").
284. See Legal Profession Faces Radical Revamp, supra note 280, at 4 (explaining Lord
Chancellor's green paper provides that once statutory restriction against MDPs has
been removed Law Society must satisfy competition authority that remaining restric-
tions are "not unnecessarily anti-competitive."); Waller, supra note 271, at 17 (explain-
ing "in due course .. . [the Law Society] will have to satisfy the government that the
rules are not anticompetitive.").
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surrounding MDPs. 285 In 1996, the Law Society began reviewing
the feasibility of MDPs and their implications on control, confi-
dentiality, and conflicts of interest.28 6
C. Another Reason For Prohibiting MDPs
Jurisdictions adopted restrictive rules governing law firm
ownership and MDPs to preserve the independent judgment of
lawyers by preventing nonlawyer influences on members of the
bar.287 At least one commentator notes, however, that these
rules were not only intended to prevent lay persons and other
professionals from influencing lawyers, but also to bar nonlawy-
ers from usurping lawyers' work.28 8 Other commentators be-
lieve that restrictive rules aimed at nonlawyers exist to protect
lawyers' economic interests. 289 In fact, some commentators as-
sert that the ABA excludes nonlawyers from the legal profession
altogether as a form of economic protectionism.29 ° This justifi-
285. See Bassirian, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing Law Society's special steering
group on MDPs).
286. See MDP-Minded, supra note 275, at 15 (discussing review of potential
problems with MDPs).
287. See Kenneth S. Kilimnik, Lawyers Abroad: New Rules for Practice in a Global Econ-
omy, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 269, 319 (1994) (analyzing purpose of rules prohibiting lawyers
from forming partnerships to practice law with nonlawyers).
288. See id. (noting additional motives behind rules prohibiting lawyers from form-
ing partnerships with nonlawyers to practice law).
289. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3 (1981)
(questioning bar's stated motive of protecting public behind bar's campaign against
unauthorized practice of law); Kaplan, supra note 24, at 1 (explaining Professor Hazard
believes that real purpose of ABA Model Rule on lay investment is to "insulate the small
law firm from competition for legal services."); Levinson, supra note 5, at 233 ("The
motivation for preserving the domain of the [legal] profession may be, in part, the
profession's concern for its own well-being and survival .... ."). By 1976, 96% of U.S.
states' bar associations had developed unauthorized practice committees to monitor the
activities of nonlegal ventures and to ensure such ventures did not encroach on the
domain of practicing lawyers. See Rhode, supra, at 15 (examining unauthorized prac-
tice of law restrictions); Munneke, supra note 14, at 562 & n.14 (explaining unauthor-
ized practice committees were created to monitor activities of nonlegal organizations
that "have encroached upon the domain of practicing lawyers" and that ABA formu-
lated "Statement of Principles" describing numerous nonlegal professions' permissible
activities in relation to legal activities "to ensure that nonlawyers did not practice law").
These committees, however, have fallen into disfavor because of legal setbacks, antitrust
concerns, and "the increasingly unclear distinction between the practice of law and the
pursuit of related fields[,]" and in their wake, "a more laissez-faire, free market environ-
ment has evolved." Munneke, supra, at 563-64.
290. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 25, at 616 (explaining "economic protectionism
often can be read between the lines of the justifications given for excluding nonlawyers
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cation surfaced during the debates surrounding the Kutak Com-
mission's proposals for Model Rule 5.4.291 The official legislative
history of the rules, however, does not mention economic pro-
tectionism as a reason for rejecting the Kutak Commission's pro-
posal.29 2
Commentators frequently explain that the Big Six's legal ac-
tivities increase competition for traditional law firms.293 Several
lawyers openly fear the increased competition that the repeal of
restrictive ownership rules would create.294 For example, in re-
sponse to a proposed Hong Kong law permitting MDPs, a part-
ner of a U.S.-based law firm's Hong Kong office explained that
lawyers in Hong Kong fear the proposed law because the entry of
accounting firms in the legal services market threatens to usurp
from the business of law."). Professors Hazard and Hodes identify economic protec-
tionism as the hidden and illegitimate rationale behind the canons excluding nonlawy-
ers from the legal profession. See HAZARD, JR. & HODES, supra note 27, at 471 (analyzing
reasons for prohibition against nonlawyer partners in law firms).
291. See Andrews, supra note 25, at 616 (analyzing debates concerning Model Rule
forbidding nonlawyers from forming partnerships with lawyers). One ABA delegate,
during the debates, asked: "How will you explain to the sole practitioner who finds
himself with competition with [sic] Sears why you voted for this? How will you explain
to the man in the mid-size firm who is being put out of business by the (B] ig [Six] ...
firms?" Id. (citing Unedited Transcript of ABA House of Delegates Session 28, at 48-49
(Feb. 8, 1983)) (quoting Al Conant).
292. See THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN
THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 160 (1987) (stating legislative history of Model Rule
5.4); see also Andrews, supra note 25, at 616 n.208 (examining legislative history of
Model Rules).
293. See, e.g., Smith, New Adversaries, supra note 17, at 6 (explaining Big Six legal
practices impose competitive burdens on traditional law firms worldwide because of
their size). For example, some commentators believe KPMG Fidal cannot be ignored
because of its size, its presence throughout France, and its affiliations with KPMG's
international network. Dillon & Griffiths, supra note 3, at 27. KPMG Fidal competes
with French and Anglo-American law firms and with the legal divisions of other Big Six
accounting firms and may eventually dominate them according to Dillon and Griffiths.
See id. (adding that "[KPMG] Fidal may be a slumbering giant - poised to awaken to its
own enormous potential"). A partner of an England-based law firm's Paris office warns
that KPMG Fidal's size, organizational structure, and combination of different profes-
sions makes it a threat to traditional law firms. See id. at 27-28 (citing partner of Eng-
land-based law firm Clifford Chance's Paris office).
294. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 3, atAl (noting reactions of several practitioners to
permitting MDPs). One professor notes that European lawyers resent the Big Six's
practice of law because of the competition it provides. Abel, supra note 11, at 747. In
England, the chairman of the National Committee of the Young Solicitors Group stated
that opposition to Big Six entering the legal arena from solicitors "is doubtless gener-
ated by fear." Maher, supra note 276, at 2.
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law firms' less sophisticated work.295 A partner of another U.S.-
based law firm added that accounting firms would likely expand
their practice to high-end transactions.296 At least one legal ex-
pert believes that accountants are already stealing high-end legal
business from law firms. 297 The expert adds that the Big Six ac-
counting firms are moving toward a legal practice that in the
future may compete with the top U.S. law firms. 298
II. ISSUES REGARDING MDPS: PROS AND CONS
It is generally accepted that lawyers often require a number
of services to represent clients. 299 Lawyers, however, have de-
bated the form of practices that lawyers may establish to best pro-
vide these services.30° One side asserts that MDPs should be per-
295. See Klein, supra note 3, at Al (quoting partner of Cleveland, U.S.-based law
firm Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue's Hong Kong). The Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue part-
ner observed that the proposal to permit MDPs in Hong Kong "strikes terror in the
hearts of lawyers ... [because] [i]t attacks our bread and butter. The fear is that ac-
counting firms would take away lower-end business, without which most law firms can't
survive." Id.
296. See id. (revealing that partner of U.S.-based law firm White & Case is worried
because he has "never known anyone but Woolworth's that's entered at the low end of
the market and stayed there"). A senior partner with U.S.-based law firm Shearman &
Sterling acknowledged that the Big Six accounting firms can give law firms competition
in any given deal. See Smith, New Adversaries, supra note 17, at 7 (citing Shearman &
Sterling senior partner).
297. See Smith, New Adversaries, supra note 17, at 7 (citing Texas, U.S.-based con-
sultant to lawyers and accountants). The consultant explained that "clients [in Europe]
used to divide up pieces of a deal between a Davis Polk [& Wardwell, a U.S.-based law
firm,] and a Price Waterhouse[,] . . . [n]ow they're giving a little more to Price
Waterhouse. Someday they may give it all to Price Waterhouse." Id.
298. See id. (citing Texas, U.S.-based consultant to lawyers and accountants).
299. See supra note 126 (recognizing that lawyers generally require additional serv-
ices to assist clients); see also David Lauter, 'Outsiders' Who Work For Firms; Using Non-
Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1984, at 1 (stating that "law is increasingly multi-disciplinary
... requiring a range of services to represent a client. Economists[,] ... [accountants,
lobbyists, and engineers] ... were always brought in on an ad hoc basis, but if you're an
integral part of the firm, it adds another dimension"); Waller, supra note 271, at 17
(explaining England's Department of Trade and Industry acknowledged that MDPs
"might help the large professional practices meet the increasing demand from their
clients for a wider range of specialised services and enable them to recruit and retain
the necessary staff to provide these services"). The head of Andersen's English law firm,
Garrett, asserts that clients' positive response to Garrett's association with Andersen
confirms that many client want "integrated, multidisciplinary business-advice services."
See Fennell, supra note 13 (citing head of Garrett).
300. See, e.g., supra notes 143-55 and accompanying text (examining debate sur-
rounding law firm ownership by nonlawyers).
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mitted because MDPs offer a variety of benefits to clients. 30 1 Op-
ponents of MDPs respond that combining legal services with
other activities would detrimentally affect the legal profession
and the general public.3 °2
A. Efficiency
Proponents of MDPs argue that MDPs benefit clients be-
cause the ability to retain an organization whose staff can handle
all of the legal and extralegal issues involved in a client's repre-
sentation increases efficiency.30 3  The proponents argue that
MDPs cause clients to need only one firm and, thus, reduce cli-
ents' costs because there is only one company to instruct, com-
munication between members of the same firm is better, there is
a better liaison between advisors, and projects are stream-
lined.3 °4
At least one opponent of MDPs argues that achieving an ef-
ficient market for legal services creates a problem.30 ' The oppo-
nent argues that an efficient market for legal services would re-
distribute nonlegal and legal personnel into the most profitable
practice area and geographical location.30 6 This would create a
shortage of legal services in less profitable areas.3 7
301. See, e.g., Patten, supra note 37, at 27 (facilitate efficiency of legal services);
Munneke, supra note 14, at 568 (benefit law firms); Nigel Page, Taxing Times: Quality vs
Quantity?, LEGAL Bus., July/Aug. 1991, at 18, 21 (foster client comfort and confidence).
An Arnold & Porter partner explained that MDPs could combine the talents of people
from different professions and "have as their mission the broader goal of problem solv-
ing." Fitzpatrick, supra note 176, at 465. Mr. Fitzpatrick added the result would be an
organization that best supported clients' overall needs. Id.
302. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 5, at 243, 247 (fee increases); id. (pressure to
refer work to other members of MDP ("intra-firm referrals")); id. at 242, 247 (profes-
sional independence); id. (conflicts of interest); id. (confidentiality); Maher, supra note
276, at 2 (attorney-client privilege); Levinson, supra, at 242, 247 (distract lawyers from
practice of law); Dillon & Griffiths, supra note 3, at 29 (stifle creative and innovative
legal approaches).
303. See Patten, supra note 37, at 27 (discussing arguments made by proponents of
MDPs that MDPs are more efficient than traditional law firms).
304. See id. (describing proponents of MDPs' arguments that MDPs are efficient).
305. See Levinson, supra note 5, at 243, 247 (warning of problems with efficient
legal services market).
306. Id.
307. See id. (explaining efficient legal market creates risk of shortages of legal ser-
vice providers in less profitable practice and geographical areas).
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B. Effects of Competition
Proponents of MDPs assert that, generally, any rules limit-
ing access to the domestic legal market will result in higher
prices and less services."30 Government regulation of legal serv-
ices typically produces a cartel30 9 in the domestic legal services
market,3 10 thereby increasing consumer prices and reducing
services as compared to the prices and services in competitive
markets.31 I At least one commentator argues that Model Rule
5.4's prohibition of MDPs harms consumers of legal services by
suppressing competition in the supply of services and thereby
increasing the price for the services.3 12 Additionally, some pro-
308. See MichaelJ. Chapman & PaulJ. Tauber, Note, Liberalizing International Trade
in Legal Services: A Proposal for an Annex on Legal Services Under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 941, 955 (1995) (describing effects of government
regulation on market activities). Chapman & Tauber explain that
[t]he most visible effect of governmental regulation of legal services is that it
typically results in the establishment of a cartel in the domestic legal services
market .... In cartelized markets, prices paid by consumers tend to be higher
and fewer goods or services tend to be provided than in competitive markets.
Id. at 954 (footnotes omitted). A study of the deregulation of legal services in housing
conveyances in Great Britain revealed the potential benefits of ending cartels in legal
services markets:
The study demonstrated that price discrimination became more difficult and
costs to consumers decreased by about one-third as competition increased. In
addition, the authors suggested that the quality of service increased at all price
levels due to deregulation. Although the study was narrow in scope, it is im-
portant evidence that both commercial entities and individuals could benefit
substantially from the increased competition in the legal services industry.
Id. at 955 (footnotes omitted). A cartel is a group of sellers of a product who join
together to control the product's production, sale, and price in the hope of obtaining
the advantages of a monopoly. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS,
PRINCIPAL AND POLICY. MICROECONOMICs 235 (4th ed. 1988) (defining cartel). A mo-
nopoly is "an industry in which there is only one supplier of a product for which there
are no close substitutes, and in which it is very hard or impossible for another firm to
coexist." BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 308, at 214. With respect to lawyers, a monop-
oly is "the exclusive right of lawyers to do for the public those things that have been
legislatively or judicially defined as 'the practice of law' .... " See Barlow F. Christensen,
The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-or Even Good
Sense?, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. REs. J. 159, 160 (1980) (discussing unauthorized practice of
law).
309. See supra note 308 (defining cartel).
310. See Chapman & Tauber, supra note 308, at 954 (noting governmental regula-
tion of legal services usually results in cartelizing domestic legal services market).
311. See id. (comparing cartelized markets to competitive markets).
312. See Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About W4hen We Talked About Ethics: A Criti-
cal View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 268 (1985) (stating that Model Rule 5.4
"suppresses competition on the supply side. The fewer the consumer alternatives, the
more lawyer-employers can charge for their employees's time").
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ponents of MDPs suggest that the legal services market would
benefit from the increased competition and investment that
would result from allowing banks, retailers, and insurance com-
panies to expand into legal services."' Liberalizing law firm
ownership rules and the increased competition that would result
would enable lawyers to seek the most efficient organizational
structure in which to provide legal services.3 1 4 One commenta-
tor believes that such changes might actually help law firms sur-
vive in the future.31
Opponents of MDPs argue that if the U.S. legal services
market was opened to MDPs, the Big Six would immediately
dominate because of their advantage in size, diversity, resources,
and client base.31 6 Some commentators assert that the Big Six
domination would reduce the number of MDPs consumers
could choose from as the size of the consumers' projects in-
creases because only the Big Six would have the size and re-
sources to handle large projects. 31 7 The opponents argue that
the resulting Big Six MDPs' oligopoly1 8 would undermine any
efficiency gained from economies of scale 319 achieved by the Big
Six MDPs320 and, thus, lead to fee increases.3 2' At least one MDP
313. See HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 982 (revealing arguments made by
proponents of MDPs surrounding effects of MDPs). One commentator added: "We
have long thought that many of the strictures that the 'establishment' arm of the [legal]
profession placed were stifling - not only to the growth of legal practices, but also to
the delivery of legal services to consumers." Editorial, What Now, the Dow?, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 19, 1987, at 12.
314. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 568 (explaining that "a removal of the eco-
nomic restrictions resulting from the current rules could allow lawyers to compete
more effectively in the free market environment of today's business world.").
315. See id. (discussing' effects on law firms of liberalizing law firm ownership
rules). Removing the current law firm ownership restrictions "might actually help law
firms survive in the coming decades." Id.
316. See Patten, supra note 37, at 27 (discussing potential advantages of Big Six
MDPs).
317. See id. (analyzing problem of decreasing choice with large projects); see also
Levinson, supra note 5, at 243, 247 (stating that MDPs create risk that "the market...
will concentrate nonlegal as well as legal services in a small mmber of large firms.").
318. See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 308, at 233 (defining oligopoly). An oli-
gopoly is "a market dominated by a few sellers at least several of which are large enough
relative to the total market to be able to influence the market price." Id.
319. See id. at 295 (defining economies of scale). Economies of scale "are savings
that are acquired through increases in quantities produced." Id.
320. See Patten, supra note 37, at 27 (noting that "[t]he theoretical economies of
scale may be offset by a quasi-monopolistic tendency to increase prices.").
321. See Levinson, supra note 5, at 243, 247 (warning that concentrating work
among small number of large firms would lead to fee increases).
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opponent, moreover, notes that larger firms are not necessarily
less costly because of their elevated fixed costs. 3 2 2
C. Pressures and Quality Control
Opponents of MDPs assert that consumers' freedom to ob-
tain the best services would be curtailed by MDPs because con-
sumers would be pressured by MDPs to choose a single firm to
provide a variety of services.323 The opponents argue that this
presents problems because an MDP may deliver top service in
one area but not in others, thereby causing a client to receive
great services in some areas but not in other areas.324 Oppo-
nents of MDPs also assert that in MDPs there is pressure to use
nonlawyer personnel when advising clients even when unneces-
sary and to bill the client for the nonlegal services because of the
financial commitment MDPs make to the nonlawyer person-
nel.325 Opponents of MDPs further argue that large, global
firms raise quality control problems because work would be auto-
matically referred to other members of the practice, despite the
possibility that there are better qualified professionals at other
firms to better handle that work.326 For example, a former
Coopers partner explained that Coopers' audit unit in France
would strongly suggest to clients that they work with Coopers' in-
house tax and legal division in France, and that this was prob-
lematic because Coopers in France was not always the best in a
particular area.327
Proponents of MDPs note, however, that MDP clients always
retain the freedom to choose different counsel from another
MDP or a traditional law firm. 28 The proponents also assert
322. See Patten, supra note 37, at 27 (discussing large firms). A fixed cost is "the
cost of the inputs which the firm needs to produce any output at all." See BAUMOL &
BLINDER, supra note 308, at 122 (defining fixed cost).
323. See Patten, supra note 37, at 27 (explaining MDP clients will be pressured to
be serviced by MDP in all areas MDP practices).
324. See id. (noting that "any given company may be stronger in some aspects of its
business than others, especially at particular times, and the client will be obliged to take
the rough with the smooth.").
325. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 5, at 242, 247 (discussing pressures in MDPs).
326. See Page, supra note 301, at 21-22 (explaining worldwide accounting firms
obliged to refer work to their offices in other jurisdictions though they may not be best
in that jurisdiction); Dillon & Griffiths, supra note 3, at 29-30 (discussing pressure to
refer work intra-firm).
327. See Dillon & Griffiths, supra note 3, at 29-30 (citing former Coopers partner).
328. See, e.g., id. at 30 (explaining KPMG Fidal client Meridien Group only used
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that the pressure to refer work intra-firm does not necessarily
exist.329 Another proponent of MDPs argues that any internal
pressure to refer work intra-firm that does exist in Big Six firms
may not be as great as some opponents of MDPs believe because
the Big Six are not global partnerships but merely individual
partnerships in each jurisdiction so they are not necessarily obli-
gated to refer work to their counterparts in other jurisdic-
tions.3 ° Moreover, the same concern over pressure to refer
work intra-firm currently exists within law firms .3 3  A partner in
one department of a firm, such as the corporate department, is
not restricted by ethics rules from advising a client to award its
other legal business, such as litigation work, to the firm's litiga-
tion department if the litigation department can handle the
work. 32
firm for routine legal matters, while retaining a competitor for complex matters and
that "no sensible client would really pay for the services of lawyers that couldn't do the
job.").
329. See, e.g., id. at 28 (analyzing pressure to refer work intra-firm). For example, a
KPMG Fidal partner explained that KPMG Fidal "functions entirely separately from its
auditing counterpart and that there is no overt - or even subtle - pressure from the
auditing side to do things in a particular way." See id. (citing KPMG Fidal partner). A
consultant for professional services firms noted that although the majority of MDPs
advise clients to use other services of the firm, "remarkably, few of these firms (if any)
have made cross-selling a normal part of daily behavior. Individuals are more likely to
focus on improving the profitability of their own group than on assisting other groups
to penetrate 'their' clientele." David H. Maister, Creating the Collaborative Firm, AM.
LAW., Oct. 1991, at 31.
330. See Page, supra note 301, at 21 (analyzing structure of Big Six). A tax partner
with England-based law firm Linklaters & Paines maintains that "clients are becoming
more aware: ... they realize that global networks are not necessarily a real asset." Id. A
member of England-based law firm Slaughter and May's tax department continues:
Size does not matter .... My experience would be that the large accountancy
firms are very useful for a large international group setting up, for example,
leasing operations in Europe, when a generalised overview of the position in a
number ofjurisdictions is needed. But if you are working on a major interna-
tional deal, you need to be able to go [sic] the people who have the best
expertise to do that particular job.
Id. at 21-22.
331. See In the Hot Seat, LEGAL Bus., July/Aug. 1991, 38, 39 (citing accountant and
barrister partner of England-based accounting firm Brebner Allen & Trapp).
332. See id. (discussing intra-firm referrals in law firms). The accountant and bar-
rister partner of Brebner Allen & Trapp opined that "no commercial law partner will
say to a client that he should take his litigation to another firm instead of to his own
litigation partner." See id. (citing Brebner Allen & Trapp partner).
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D. Familiarity and Comfort
Proponents of MDPs state that MDPs nurture client comfort
and confidence with legal representationY 3 Big Six accounting
firms maintain that their worldwide offices enable them to satisfy
the needs of multinational corporate and financial business con-
sulting clients." 4 The accountants continue that a Big Six firm's
client involved in deals in countries where that Big Six firm has a
presence, will be confident and comfortable with the knowledge
that the Big Six firm's personnel familiar to the client's account-
ant will be assisting with transactions and will be confident be-
cause the work will not be referred to someone the accountant
does not know.
33 5
E. Distraction from the Practice of Law, Professional Independence,
Conflicts of Interest, and the Attorney-Client Privilege
Opponents of MDPs argue that MDPs introduce problems
with the independence of lawyers, conflicts of interest,336 and
the attorney-client privilege, 7 and that MDPs generally distract
333. See Page, supra note 301, at 21 (discussing feelings of consumers of MDPs
towards MDPs).
334. See id. (explaining "accountants argue that their worldwide offices equip
them to service the needs of the emerging multinational corporate and financial play-
ers"). Messrs. Tite, and Lewis, partners of Tite & Lewis, note that the largest corporate
clients want global services and that Coopers "can already provide them on a scale big-
ger than the largest... [London] law firms can offer and that is where the accountants
have the edge." See Fennell, supra note 13 (quoting Messrs. Tite and Lewis).
335. See Page, supra note 301, at 21 (citing Price Waterhouse tax partner). A tax
partner of Price Waterhouse in England believes the accounting firm's international
presence is advantageous because, for example, prospective clients making acquisitions
in Italy and Hong Kong will be at ease because they will be referred to Price
Waterhouse partners in those jurisdictions and they will not have to refer work to some-
one unfamiliar to their accountant. See id. (citing Price Waterhouse tax partner). A
commentator notes that" [t] here can be no doubt of the significant clout which [Price
Waterhouse's worldwide presence] gives them in pitching for multinational clients." Id.
336. See Top Manchester Accountant, supra note 3, at 8 (according to managing part-
ner of England-based accounting firm Clark Whitehill, "[t]he supermarket approach
will quite clearly hit dedicated legal firms and introduce all sorts of questions about
independence and conflicts of interest."); All the Rage, supra note 3, at 11 (citing U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission's severe guidelines on auditor/lawyer indepen-
dence as proof of conflicts of interest resulting from combining accounting and legal
professions).
337. See Maher, supra note 276, at 2 (discussing MDPs' implications on attorney-
client privilege).
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lawyers from the practice of law. 38 First, an opponent of MDPs
notes that MDPs jeopardize confidentiality and give rise to con-
flicts of interest because nonlawyers in MDPs are not governed
by lawyers' ethics standards. 9 In addition, another commenta-
tor believes that professionals of the same firm may resist criticiz-
ing each others' performance, while attorneys practicing sepa-
rately from professionals in other fields would be more likely to
disclose to the client their criticism of the other professional's
work.34 ° Furthermore, a commentator argues that MDPs pose a
risk that nonlawyers will unduly influence the firm in several
matters that require lawyer independence.34 1 First, nonlawyers
may influence decisions regarding law firm management, such
as whether to accept certain clients.342 Second, nonlawyers may
influence decisions concerning the firm's participation in the ac-
tivities of the legal profession, such as commenting on proposed
new rules of ethics. 43 Finally, nonlawyers may unduly influence
decisions affecting the performance of the public role of law-
yers,344 such as bringing legal issues to society's attention, initiat-
ing law reforms, and confronting governmental arbitrariness.345
Moreover, opponents of MDPs argue that the enormous size of
Big Six accounting firms limits the kind of work they may per-
form because of conflicts. 3 46 Opponents also argue that MDPs
338. See Levinson, supra note 5, at 242, 247 (commenting on distraction to lawyers
caused by nonlegal services).
339. Id.
340. See Patten, supra note 37, at 27 (asking whether "members of the same firm
would be just as willing to criticise inadequate performance by one part of the multi-
disciplinary team as outsiders[,]" while under the current rules "experienced solicitors
may draw a client's attention to concern over some aspect of an accountant's perform-
ance and vice versa.").
341. Levinson, supra note 5, at 242, 247.
342. See id. (explaining risk that nonlawyers in MDPs will "unduly influence" law-
related decisions, such as whether to accept unpopular clients).
343. See id. (noting potential influence of nonlawyers over decisions regarding par-
ticipation in activities of legal profession).
344. See id. (discussing public role of legal profession).
345. See id. at 236 (offering examples of lawyers' public role).
346. See Smith, New Adversaries, supra note 17, at 11 (discussing conflicts of interest
in Big Six). Mr. Smith states:
The Big-Six are also naturally limited by their enormous size in the kind of
work they can do. ... [M]ajor transactions as well as litigation generate what
could be unmanageable conflict problems. That's why ... [sophisticated]
transactions like [Mergers and Acquisitions] seem more practicable in the
context of a law firm that has hundreds, not thousands, of partners and associ-
ates.
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are problematic because criminal clients may reveal their cases
to non-attorneys instead of lawyers, and thus lose the attorney-
client privilege.3 47 Finally, at least one opponent of MDPs fears
that lawyers in MDPs would be distracted from the practice of
law and thus jeopardize lawyers' competence and diligence. 48
A practitioner responds that conflicts will not arise because
the legal profession and the accounting profession each must
follow specified regulations.349 In addition, a professor notes
that many of the potential attacks on professional independence
are already faced by lawyers that are employed by corporations
and other organizations that do not offer legal services.35 ° An-
other proponent of MDPs explains that criminal clients today
may enter a traditional law firm and reveal their cases to
nonlawyers such as clerks, and thus lose the attorney-client privi-
lege. 351
F. Innovative Services
Opponents of MDPs also assert that combining law firms
and accounting firms stifles creative and innovative legal and tax
Id.
347. See Maher, supra note 276, at 2 (describing attorney-client privilege issues sur-
rounding MDPs).
348. Levinson, supra note 5, at 242, 247.
349. See Dillon & Griffiths, supra note 3, at 28 (citing President of KPMG Fidal).
The President of KPMG Fidal instructs that although KPMG Fidal has a number ofjoint
clients with KPMG, conflicts do not arise because the legal profession and the account-
ing profession each must follow specified regulations. See id. (citing President of KPMG
Fidal).
350. See Kaplan, supra note 24, at I (quoting Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.).
Professor Hazard states: "The ostensible justification for the ABA's rule [forbidding
nonlawyers from owning law firms] has been as a prophylactic to prevent lawyers being
supervised by non-lawyers. But given that that can happen in a corporate law depart-
ment and in other permissible forms, it's not a very coherent rule." See id. (quoting
Professor Hazard). Model Rule 1.13 generally governs the responsibilities of lawyers
employed by organizations. MODEL RULES, supra note 24, Rule 1.13. Although the
Model Code does not have a specific DR aimed at lawyers employed by organizations,
EC 5-18 offers general principles that lawyers employed by organizations should follow.
See id. Rule 1.13 Model Code Comparison (examining Model Code provisions directed
at lawyers employed by organizations).
351. See Maher, supra note 276, at 2 (comparing MDPs to law firms). Mr. Maher
observes that concerns that nonlawyers in MDPs may create problems for the attorney-
client privilege are no different from nonlawyer personnel in law firms, because a client
may speak with a solicitor's clerk who is not a solicitor but who sees clients as an agent
of the solicitor." Id.
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approaches.352 For example, auditors are careful to avoid mis-
takes and, thus, are unlikely to encourage tax or legal personnel
to develop innovative solutions.3 53 Clients of one Big Six MDP,
however, state that the firm develops innovative solutions when
appropriate .
III. UNITED STATES JURISDICTIONS SHOULD PERMIT MDPS
Commentators, practitioners, and others involved in the de-
bate over MDPs assert either that the prohibition against MDPs
should be preserved, that the prohibition should be modified to
permit regulated MDPs, or that MDPs should be permitted and
that there is no need to regulate the association between lawyers
and nonlawyers. 5  Based on the evidence and arguments sur-
rounding the debate over MDPs, all U.S. jurisdictions should
permit regulated MDPs. The practices under the present ethics
rules, the evidence strongly indicating that current restrictions
are in part a form of economic protectionism, and the develop-
ments in England support the arguments of MDP proponents.
The arguments advanced by the opponents of MDPs, instead,
are generally undermined by current practices.
A. Practices Under the Present U.S. Ethics Rules Support
MDP Proponents
The ban on MDPs should be removed in the United States
because the current U.S. ethics rules, the Model Rules, and the
Model Code permit lawyers to face many of the ethical chal-
lenges that MDP opponents argue will plague MDPs. First, the
current rules permit lawyers to own ancillary businesses although
ancillary businesses interfere with lawyers' ability to fulfill profes-
352. See, e.g., Dillon & Griffiths, supra note 3, at 29 (noting that several of KPMG
Fidal's competitors "assert that the relationship with the accountancy firm is also bound
to stifle creative or more innovative approaches to the legal or tax practice.").
353. See id. (describing auditors' lack of innovativeness). Auditors are unlikely to
encourage cutting-edge solutions by the legal or tax team working with them." Id.
354. See id. (noting that several of KPMG Fidal's clients are "satisfied that [KPMG]
Fidal is suggesting innovative solutions when appropriate."). The executive vice presi-
dent of finance for hotel industry Meridien Group explained that "[t]he partner we
work with [at KPMG Fidal] knows us very well, and he knows we like creative proposi-
tions." Id. KPMG Fidal's literature states: "[KPMG] Fidal offers a dynamic and creative
way of looking at problems which is productive for the company." See id. (quoting from
KPMG Fidal brochure).
355. See Abel, supra note 11, at 763 (outlining views on MDPs).
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sional obligations, give rise to problems with confidentiality, con-
flicts of interest, interference with lawyers' professional judg-
ment, nonlawyer influence or control of law firms, and pressure
on clients.3 56 Second, the Model Rules and Model Code permit
lawyers to serve on the boards of directors of clients and to trans-
act business with clients although these activities challenge law-
yers' independent judgment and create dangerous conflicts of
interest.3 57 Finally, the current ethics rules arguably permit law-
yers to practice law in organizational structures that are very sim-
ilar to MDPs and that raise the same ethical challenges for law-
yers. For example, under the ethics rules a law firm and an ac-
counting firm may enter into an office-sharing arrangement,
where the legal and nonlegal activities are independently owned
and operated but the law firm shares office space with the ac-
counting firm.358 The law firm may primarily practice business
planning matters while the accounting firm employs a number
of certified accountants and engages in audit services. Although
each firm operates under its own lease, they may share an over-
lapping management team that provides common support serv-
ices such as word processing, reception, and billing.3 51 Under
the Model Rules and Model Code there would probably be no
ethical violations if the law firm and the accounting firm infor-
mally refer clients to each other, or if the law firm uses account-
ants employed by the accounting firm as experts in its cases.160
Similarly, the law firm is permitted under the Model Rules and
Model Code to hold an economic or controlling interest in the
accounting group as long as the law firm does not violate any
ethical rules, particularly those covering dealings with nonlawy-
ers.36 1 In addition, the law firm would be permitted to hire the
accountants as employees of the firm to do work in conjunction
356. See supra notes 181-230 and accompanying text (analyzing debate surround-
ing ancillary businesses).
357. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text (discussing lawyer-client busi-
ness transactions and lawyer service on clients' boards of directors). Professor Hazard
notes that lawyers serving on the boards of directors of corporations represented by the
lawyer's firm or lawyers conducting business transactions with clients, raise "equal or
greater interference" with independent professional judgment than ancillary busi-
nesses. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 20, at 985.
358. See Munneke, supra note 14, at 573 (discussing office-sharing arrangements).
359. See id. (discussing office-sharing arrangements).
360. See id. (analyzing office-sharing arrangements under Model Rules and Model
Code provisions governing referrals).
361. See id. at 572-73 (commenting on lawyer ownership of other businesses).
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with the firm's cases, and could even share profits with the ac-
countants through qualified pension or profit sharing plans.3 6 2
Because these arrangements are permissible under the U.S. eth-
ics rules although they closely resemble MDPs, the ban on MDPs
should be removed.
B. Other Evidence Supports MDP Proponents
Multi-discipline practices should be permitted in the United
States because many of the problems that opponents of MDPs
argue will occur with MDPs, can be undermined. First, generally
today, only the larger law firms have the size and resources to
handle large projects. This directly undermines the argument
made by MDP opponents that the Big Six MDPs would dominate
legal practice and, thus, reduce the number of firms for consum-
ers to choose from as the size of consumers' projects increase
because only the Big Six MDPs would .have the size and re-
sources to handle large projects.363 In addition, the law firms
that now handle large projects would be capable of competing
with the Big Six MDPs for large projects. Furthermore, the in-
creased competition could trigger modifications in law firms
that would permit them to compete more effectively in the free
market environment of today's world and offer consumers lower
rates.3 6 4 Second, pressure to refer work intra-firm already exists
in law firms and, in some instances, may not exist or be as strong
as believed in MDPs.365 Third, MDPs should not be banned sim-
ply because Big Six MDPs may stifle innovative legal approaches.
Not only is this argument limited to MDPs with large numbers of
accountants, but at least one Big Six firm's client has noted that
the firm's legal department develops innovative legal solu-
366tions.
362. See id. at 573 (analyzing Model Rules and Model Code provisions governing
nonlawyer employees).
363. See supra note 317 and accompanying text (discussing effects of Big Six's size
and resources).
364. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text (examining benefits to law
firms of increased competition).
365. See supra notes 329-32 and accompanying text (discussing pressure for intra-
firm referrals).
366. See supra note 354 and accompanying text (revealing reaction of KPMG Fidal
client).
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C. Nonlawyers may Practice Tax Law
The prohibition against MDPs should be removed because
nonlawyers are already permitted to advise clients in certain
practice areas. Certified Public Accountants can represent cli-
ents before the Internal Revenue Service and other government
agencies may permit nonlawyers to practice before them. 67 Per-
mitting nonlawyers to practice law, although only in limited cir-
cumstances, is potentially more dangerous to the public than al-
lowing MDPs, yet it is permitted.
D. Current Rules Protect Lawyers' Economic Interests
Multi-discipline practices should be permitted because the
inconsistencies in the Model Rules and Model Code and the
comments of practitioners and commentators strongly support
the proposition that a major reason for the prohibitive rules to-
day is to protect lawyers' economic interests. 6 Many practition-
ers fear the competition that Big Six firms would provide if per-
mitted to practice law. 6 9 The Big Six, however, cannot domi-
nate unless consumers shift their business to Big Six MDPs.
Consumers probably will not shift their business until the Big
Six's legal services are well regarded. Indeed, the Big Six MDPs
may never gain enough competence to attract clients away from
established law firms.
Model Rule 5.7, permitting lawyers to compete with busi-
nesses through ancillary businesses, and the double standard of
enforcement of the rule are representative of the evidence that
supports the accusation of economic protectionism. Although
lawyers may own ancillary businesses that offer nonlegal services
in conjunction with the practice of law, nonlawyers are not al-
lowed to participate in the legal profession as financial stake-
holders.37 °
367. See supra note 10 (noting that federal law permits CPAs to practice before
Internal Revenue Service and permits government agencies to allow other nonlawyers
to represent clients before agency).
368. See supra notes 288-98 (examining whether U.S. ethics rules protect lawyers'
economic interests).
369. See supra notes 293-98 and accompanying text (noting lawyers' fears of in-
creased competition).
370. See supra notes 111, 205-07 and accompanying text (discussing rules gov-
erning ancillary businesses and law firm ownership).
MDPS IN THE UNITED STATES
E. England Eliminated the Statutory Ban on MDPs Because it No
Longer Served the Public Interest
United States jurisdictions should follow the English govern-
ment and permit MDPs. Although the Law Society has main-
tained the restriction against MDPs,37 1 the English government
eliminated the statutory ban in 1990 because it believes there are
no longer any strong public interest reasons for the restric-
tions.3 7 2 In addition, the Law Society is expected to have to
prove that the restriction is not anticompetitive, 373 a demonstra-
tion that continues to become more difficult for U.S. jurisdic-
tions to make as the practice of law increases in complexity.
E. MDPs Can be Regulated Under Several Schemes
Multi-disciplines practices in the United States could oper-
ate under the current regulatory structure or under a new
scheme. Under the current regulatory program, Model Rule 5.4
could be modified to permit MDPs and to impose liability on
lawyers for the unethical conduct of nonlawyer-members of the
firm, as Washington, D.C.'s Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
5.4 stipulates.3 74 Alternatively, professional nonlawyer owners of
MDPs could be made to face the loss of their professional license
for violations of legal ethics code or their own profession's ethics
codes.375 Enacting such rules, however, would require the action
of every U.S. jurisdiction.
The second option would be to create a new regulatory
scheme to govern MDPs. An independent regulatory body for
MDPs, composed of members from different professions, could
attempt to promulgate an ethics code for MDPs, binding any-
one, lawyer or nonlawyer, with a financial interest in an MDP.
This option, however, would take a significant amount of time to
implement.
371. See supra note 41 (discussing Law Society's rules).
372. See supra note 280 and accompanying text (giving English government's rea-
son for eliminating statutory prohibition against MDPs).
373. See supra note 284 and accompanying text (discussing Law Society's contin-
ued ban on MDPs).
374. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (examining liability under D.C.
Rule 5.4(b) (3)).
375. See, e.g. Maher, supra note 276, at 2 (detailing plan to regulate MDPs that
would make professionals answerable to their own professional body "for not only their




Today, it is widely accepted that legal matters often contain
extralegal elements. In addition, clients increasingly seek multi-
ple professional services from one source. The ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics' prohibition against nonlawyer ownership of
law firms justifiably protected the independence of lawyers. Sim-
ilar provisions in the Model Code and Model Rules were gener-
ally defended on the basis that nonlawyer involvement in law
firms created problems with conflicts of interest, confidentiality,
and client solicitation and threatened the autonomy of the legal
profession. At the end of the twentieth century, however, the
prohibition, preserved in the Model Rules and Model Code, in
large part serves the interests of the legal profession and not the
public. As the work that lawyers confront has steadily grown in
sophistication over time, both lawyers' and clients' needs have
changed. Preserving the century-old restriction does not satisfy
lawyers' or clients' needs. As the legal profession enters a new
century, it is pivotal that ethics guidelines prohibiting nonlawyer
ownership of legal service providers give way to provisions per-
mitting and regulating MDPs so that U.S. firms may best serve
clients and compete with foreign firms.
